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Abstract—Motivated by the recent efforts in extending LTE to
the unlicensed spectrum, we propose a novel spectrum sharing
framework for the coopetition (i.e., cooperation and competition)
between LTE and Wi-Fi in the unlicensed band. Basically, the
LTE network can choose to work in one of the two modes: in
the competition mode, it randomly accesses an unlicensed channel,
and interferes with the Wi-Fi access point using the same channel;
in the cooperation mode, it delivers traffic for the Wi-Fi users in
exchange for the exclusive access of the corresponding channel.
Because the LTE network works in an interference-free manner
in the cooperation mode, it can achieve a much larger data rate
than that in the competition mode, which allows it to effectively
serve both its own users and the Wi-Fi users. We design a
second-price reverse auction mechanism, which enables the LTE
provider and the Wi-Fi access point owners (APOs) to effectively
negotiate the operation mode. Specifically, the LTE provider is
the auctioneer (buyer), and the APOs are the bidders (sellers)
who compete to sell their channel access opportunities to the LTE
provider. In Stage I of the auction, the LTE provider announces
a reserve rate, which is the maximum data rate that it is willing
to allocate to the APOs in the cooperation mode. In Stage II
of the auction, the APOs submit their bids, which indicate the
data rates that they would like the LTE provider to offer in the
cooperation mode. We show that the auction involves allocative
externalities, i.e., the cooperation between the LTE provider and
one APO benefits other APOs who are not directly involved in
this cooperation. As a result, a particular APO’s willingness to
cooperate is affected by its belief about other APOs’ willingness
to cooperate. This makes our analysis much more challenging
than that of the conventional second-price auction, where bidding
truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy. We show that the
APOs have a unique form of the equilibrium bidding strategies
in Stage II, based on which we analyze the LTE provider’s
optimal reserve rate in Stage I. Numerical results show that our
framework improves the payoffs of both the LTE provider and
the APOs comparing with a benchmark scheme. In particular,
our framework increases the LTE provider’s payoff by 70% on
average when the LTE provider has a large throughput and
a small data rate discounting factor. Moreover, our framework
leads to a close-to-optimal social welfare under a large LTE
throughput.
Index Terms—Coexistence of LTE and Wi-Fi in unlicensed
band, auction with allocative externalities, symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
THE proliferation of mobile devices is leading to anexplosion of global mobile traffic, which is estimated to
reach 30.6 exabytes per month by 2020 [2]. To accommodate
this rapidly growing mobile traffic, 3GPP has been working
on proposals to enable LTE to operate in the unlicensed 5GHz
band [3].1 By extending LTE to the unlicensed spectrum, the
LTE provider can significantly expand its network capacity,
and tightly integrate its control over the licensed and unli-
censed bands [5]. Furthermore, since the LTE technology has
an efficient framework of traffic management (e.g., congestion
control), it is capable of achieving a much higher spectral
efficiency than Wi-Fi networks in the unlicensed spectrum,
if there is no competition between these two technologies
[6]. Key market players, such as AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile,
Qualcomm, and Ericsson, have already demonstrated the po-
tential of LTE in the unlicensed band through experiments
[6], and have formed several forums (e.g., LTE-U Forum [7]
and EVOLVE [8]) to promote this promising LTE unlicensed
technology.
A key technical challenge for LTE working in the unlicensed
spectrum is that it can significantly degrade the Wi-Fi network
performance if there is no effective co-channel interference
avoidance mechanism. To address this issue, industries have
proposed two major mechanisms for LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence:
(a) Qualcomm’s carrier-sensing adaptive transmission (CSAT)
scheme [9], where the LTE transmission follows a periodic
on/off pattern creating interference-free zones for Wi-Fi during
certain periods, and (b) Ericsson’s “Listen-Before-Talk” (LBT)
scheme [10], where LTE transmits only when it senses the
channel being idle for at least certain duration. However,
field tests revealed that these solutions often perform below
expectations in practice. In particular, a series of experiments
by Google revealed that both mechanisms severely affect the
performance of Wi-Fi [11]: for the CSAT mechanism, since
Wi-Fi is not designed in anticipation of LTE’s activity, it can-
not respond well to LTE’s on-off cycling, and its transmission
is severely affected; for the LBT mechanism, it is challenging
to choose the proper backoff time and transmission length
for LTE to fairly coexist with Wi-Fi. Therefore, beyond these
coexistence mechanisms, there is a need for a novel framework
that can effectively explore the potential cooperation opportu-
nity between LTE and Wi-Fi to directly avoid the co-channel
interference. This motivates our study in this work.
1The LTE unlicensed technology can also work in the 3.5GHz band [4].
However, since the available spectrum resources for the LTE technology in
the 5GHz band (500MHz) are much more than those in the 3.5GHz band
(80MHz), we focus on the interaction between the LTE and Wi-Fi in the
5GHz in this paper.
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2B. Contributions
Unlike previous solely technical coexistence mechanisms
that focused on the fair competition between LTE and Wi-Fi,
we design a novel coopetition framework. The basic idea is
that the two types of networks (LTE and Wi-Fi) should explore
the potential benefits of cooperation before deciding whether
to enter head-to-head competition. Under certain conditions
(e.g., the co-channel interference heavily reduces the data rates
of both LTE and Wi-Fi), it would be more beneficial for both
types of networks to reach an agreement on the cooperation;
otherwise, they will compete with each other based on a typical
coexistence mechanism (e.g., CSAT or LBT).
In our coopetition framework, the LTE network works in
either the competition mode or the cooperation mode. For
the competition mode, the LTE network simply shares the
access of a channel with the corresponding Wi-Fi access
point.2 For the cooperation mode, the LTE network exclusively
occupies a Wi-Fi access point’s channel and the corresponding
Wi-Fi access point does not transmit, which avoids the co-
channel interference and hence generates a high LTE data
rate. Meanwhile, the Wi-Fi access point onloads its users to
the LTE network,3 which serves the Wi-Fi access point’s users
with some data rates based on the access point’s request. Since
LTE usually achieves a much higher spectral efficiency than
Wi-Fi [6], [17], such a cooperation can potentially lead to a
win-win situation for both networks.
In our work, we want to answer the following two questions:
(1) How would LTE and Wi-Fi negotiate over which mode
(competition mode or cooperation mode) that LTE would use?
(2) If the LTE network works in the cooperation mode, how
much Wi-Fi traffic should it serve? Addressing these questions
is challenging because of the following reasons: (i) given the
increasingly large penetration of Wi-Fi technology, there are
usually multiple Wi-Fi networks in range. As we will show
in our analysis, the cooperation between the LTE network and
one Wi-Fi network imposes a positive externality to other Wi-
Fi networks not involved in the cooperation; (ii) there is no
centralized decision maker in such a system, and different
networks have conflicting interests as each of them wants to
maximize the total data rate received by its own users; (iii) the
throughput of a network (LTE or Wi-Fi) when it exclusively
occupies a channel is its private information not known by
others, which makes the coordination difficult.
To address these issues, in Section II, we design a mecha-
nism that operates with minimum signaling and computations,
and can be implemented in an almost real-time fashion. Specif-
ically, the mechanism is based on a reverse auction where the
2We consider a general coexistence scheme between LTE and Wi-Fi. Hence,
our model applies to both the CSAT and the LBT mechanisms.
3With the industrial standardization efforts (e.g., Hotspot 2.0 [12]), there is
a trend of tightly integrating the Wi-Fi technology with the cellular networks.
This enables various forms of cooperations between the cellular and Wi-Fi
network providers. A successful example is Wi-Fi data offloading, where the
cellular network providers offload their cellular traffic to the third-party Wi-Fi
networks to relieve the cellular congestion [13]–[16]. In terms of the practical
implementation, one advantage of the data onloading over the Wi-Fi data
offloading is that the data onloading can be more secure and better protect
the mobile users’ privacy. This is because the cellular networks usually provide
better security guarantees than the Wi-Fi networks.
LTE provider is the auctioneer (buyer) and wants to exclusively
obtain the channel from one of the Wi-Fi access point owners
(APOs, sellers).4 We define the payoff of a network (LTE or
Wi-Fi) as the total data rate received by its users. In Stage
I of the auction, the LTE provider announces the maximum
data rate (i.e., reserve rate) that it is willing to allocate for
serving users of the winning APO. By optimizing the reserve
rate, the LTE provider can affect the APOs’ willingness of
cooperation, and hence maximize its expected payoff. In Stage
II of the auction, given the reserve rate, the APOs report
whether they are willing to cooperate and what are the data
rates that they request from the LTE provider. Different APOs
may have different requests, since they can have different data
rates when exclusively occupying their channels. If no APO
wants to cooperate, the LTE network works in the competition
mode, and randomly accesses an APO’s channel (based on
a coexistence mechanism like CSAT or LBT); otherwise, it
works in the cooperation mode, and cooperates with the APO
that requests the lowest data rate from the LTE provider.
Such an auction mechanism is particularly challenging to
analyze since it induces positive allocative externalities [18]:
the cooperation between the LTE provider and one APO will
benefit other APOs not involved in this collaboration, because
other APOs can avoid the potential interference generated by
the LTE network under the competition mode.
In Section III, we analyze the APOs’ equilibrium strategies
in Stage II of the auction, given the LTE provider’s reserve rate
in Stage I. We show that an APO always has a unique form of
the bidding strategy at the equilibrium under a given reserve
rate. However, such a unique form of the bidding strategy
may have different closed-form expressions based on different
intervals of the reserve rate. Furthermore, our study shows
that for some APOs, the data rates they request from the LTE
provider are lower than the rates they can obtain by themselves
without the LTE’s interference. Intuitively, such a low request
motivates the LTE network to work in the cooperation mode
rather than the competition mode. In the latter case, the APOs
may receive even lower data rates due to the potential co-
channel interference from the LTE network.
In Section IV, we analyze the LTE provider’s equilib-
rium choice of reserve rate in Stage I of the auction, by
anticipating the APOs’ equilibrium strategies in Stage II.
The LTE network’s expected payoff has different closed-form
function forms, over different intervals of the reserve rate. We
analyze the optimal reserve rate by jointly considering all the
reserve rate intervals. We show that when the LTE network’s
throughout exceeds a threshold, it will choose a reasonably
large reserve rate and cooperate with some APOs; otherwise,
it will restrict the reserve rate to a small value, and eventually
work in the competition mode.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• Proposal of the LTE/Wi-Fi coopetition framework: We
propose a coopetition framework that explores the co-
operation opportunity between LTE and Wi-Fi in order
4We consider one LTE network and multiple Wi-Fi access points, since
the LTE network has a larger coverage than the Wi-Fi access points, and the
Wi-Fi access points are already very popular and exist in many areas.
3to determine whether they should directly compete with
each other. Unlike previously proposed LTE/Wi-Fi coex-
istence mechanisms, our framework can avoid the data
rate reduction when there is a cooperation opportunity
between LTE and Wi-Fi. Furthermore, our framework can
be implemented without revealing the private throughput
information of the networks.
• Equilibrium analysis of the auction with allocative ex-
ternalities: We provide rigorous analysis for an auc-
tion mechanism with positive allocative externalities that
involves more than two bidders. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work studying such a mecha-
nism in auction theory. Moreover, our work introduces a
methodology for modeling and analyzing the allocative
dependencies that arise increasingly often in wireless
systems.
• Characterization of the optimal reserve rate: We analyze
the reserve rate that maximizes the LTE network’s payoff,
and investigate its relation with the LTE throughput.
Through simulation, we show that the optimal reserve
rate is non-increasing in the LTE’s data rate discounting
factor, and non-decreasing in the LTE throughput, the
number of APOs, and the APOs’ data rate discounting
factor.
• Performance evaluation of the LTE/Wi-Fi coopetition
framework: Numerical results show that our framework
achieves larger LTE’s and APOs’ payoffs comparing
with a state-of-the-art benchmark scheme, which only
considers the competition between LTE and APOs. In
particular, our framework increases the LTE’s payoff by
70% on average when the LTE has a large throughput
and a small data rate discounting factor. Furthermore, our
framework leads to a close-to-optimal social welfare for
a large LTE throughput.
C. Related Work
This paper is an extension of our conference paper [1],
where we considered a basic model with two APOs. In this
paper, we generalize the model by considering an arbitrary
number of APOs, which substantially extends the scope
of the paper and the applicability of the results, but also
significantly complicates the analysis. Furthermore, in this
paper, we investigate the impact of the number of APOs on
the LTE provider’s and the APOs’ strategies, and compare
our auction-based scheme with a state-of-the-art benchmark
scheme through simulation. We also extensively discuss the
generalization of our work to more complicated scenarios (e.g.,
multi-LTE scenario).
Several recent studies focused on the spectrum sharing
problems for the LTE unlicensed technology. Cano et al. in
[17] and Zhang et al. in [19] discussed the major challenges
for the LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence. References [20], [21] provided
performance evaluations for the LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence. Li
et al. in [22] applied stochastic geometry to characterize the
main performance metrics (e.g., SINR coverage probability)
for the neighboring LTE and Wi-Fi networks in the unlicensed
spectrum. Jeon et al. in [23] applied a fluid network model to
analyze the interference between the LTE and Wi-Fi. Chen et
al. in [24] jointly considered the Wi-Fi data offloading and
the spectrum sharing between the LTE and Wi-Fi. Cano et
al. in [25] addressed the fair coexistence problem for general
scheduled and random access transmitters that share the same
channel. Cano et al. in [26] studied the LTE network’s channel
access probability in the CSAT mechanism to ensure the
fairness between LTE and Wi-Fi. Zhang et al. in [27] proposed
a new LBT-based MAC protocol that allows LTE to friendly
coexist with Wi-Fi. Guan et al. in [28] investigated the LTE
provider’s joint channel selection and fractional spectrum
access problem with the consideration of the fairness between
LTE and Wi-Fi. Zhang et al. in [29] analyzed the spectrum
sharing among multiple LTE providers in the unlicensed
spectrum through a hierarchical game. However, these studies
did not consider the cooperation between LTE and Wi-Fi. We
include the existing studies on LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence like
[26], [27] as part of our framework (i.e., in the competition
mode), and also consider the new possibility of cooperation
between LTE and Wi-Fi (i.e., in the cooperation mode).
In terms of the auction with allocative externalities, the most
relevant works are [18] and [30]. Jehiel and Moldovanu in
[18] provided a systematic study of the second-price forward
auction with allocative externalities. They characterized the
bidders’ bidding strategies at the equilibrium for general
payoff functions. However, they did not prove the uniqueness
of the equilibrium strategies. Bagwell et al. in [30] studied
a special example in the WTO system, where the retaliation
rights were allocated through a first-price forward auction
among different countries. The auction involves positive al-
locative externalities, and the authors showed the uniqueness
of the countries’ bidding strategies. Both [18] and [30] only
studied two bidders in the auction. In contrast, we consider
an auction with an arbitrary number of bidders, and show
the impact of the number of bidders on the auction outcome.
Furthermore, the bidders’ equilibrium strategies have different
expressions under different reserve rates announced by the
auctioneer, which makes our analysis of the optimal reserve
rate much more challenging than [18] and [30].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Basic Settings
We consider a time-slotted system, where the length of
each time slot corresponds to several minutes. We assume that
the system is quasi-static, i.e., the system parameters (which
involve mostly time average values) remain constant during
each time slot, but can change over time slots. Our analysis
focuses on the interaction between LTE and Wi-Fi networks
in a single generic time slot.5 We consider one LTE small
5Since the LTE unlicensed technology (time-division duplex mode) supports
both the uplink and downlink transmissions [5], [19], the LTE network is
able to onload both the APOs’ uplink and downlink traffic. Our framework
works for both the uplink scenario (the networks only have uplink traffic) and
downlink scenario (the networks only have downlink traffic). For example, in
the uplink scenario, all throughputs in our model correspond to the networks’
uplink throughputs. For the most general scenario, where the networks serve
uplink and downlink traffic simultaneously, each network should choose its
strategy by considering both the uplink and downlink transmissions, and we
leave the analysis of this scenario as our future work.
4cell network and a set K , {1, 2, . . . ,K} (K ≥ 2) of Wi-Fi
access points. The LTE small cell network is owned by an LTE
provider,6 and the k-th (k ∈ K) Wi-Fi access point is owned by
APO k. We assume that the APOs occupy different unlicensed
channels so that they do not interfere with each other. We use
channel k to represent the channel occupied by APO k. The
LTE small cell network has a larger coverage area than the
Wi-Fi access points [6], [9]. Furthermore, it can work in one
of the K channels, and cause interference to the corresponding
access point in the channel.7 The assumption that the APOs
occupy different channels simplifies the problem and helps
us gain key insights into the proposed auction framework. In
Section VI-A, we will discuss the extension to the scenario
where different APOs can share the same channel.
APOs’ Rates: We consider fully loaded APOs,8 and use rk
to denote the throughput that APO k ∈ K can achieve to serve
its users when it exclusively occupies channel k (without the
interference from the LTE network). The value of rk in the
time slot that we are interested in is the private information
of APO k. The LTE provider and the other K − 1 APOs
only know the probability distribution of rk. Specifically,
we assume that rk is a continuous random variable drawn
from interval [rmin, rmax] (rmin, rmax ≥ 0), and follows a
probability distribution function (PDF) f (·) and a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) F (·).9 Moreover, we assume that
f (·) > 0 for all r ∈ [rmin, rmax].
LTE’s Dual Modes: We consider a fully loaded LTE
network, and assume that it achieves a channel independent
throughput of RLTE > 0 when it exclusively occupies one of
the K channels (without the interference from the APOs).10
The LTE provider can operate its network in one of the
following modes:
-competition mode: the LTE provider randomly chooses
each channel k ∈ K with an equal probability and coexists
with APO k. Since our main focus is the design of the
auction framework, the LTE provider simply coexists with
APO k based on a typical coexistence mechanism (e.g.,
CSAT or LBT) and setting (e.g., the LTE’s backoff time and
transmission length in the LBT). The co-channel interference
decreases both the data rates of the LTE provider and the
corresponding APO. We use δLTE ∈ (0, 1) and ηAPO ∈ (0, 1)
6In Section VI-C, we will discuss the extension to the scenario where there
are multiple LTE providers.
7For ease of exposition, we use “LTE provider” and “LTE network”
interchangeably. Similarly, we use “APO” and “access point” interchangeably.
8Since the length of each time slot corresponds to several minutes, we
assume that a network has enough traffic to serve during a time slot and will
not complete its service within a time slot. This assumption simplifies the
problem, and helps us understand the fundamental benefit of organizing an
auction to onload the Wi-Fi traffic to the LTE network. Many papers made
similar saturation assumptions to analyze the network performance [31]–[33].
In the future work, we will study the scenario where the networks do not
have full loads, and can precisely predict their traffic loads in the next few
minutes.
9We assume that all rk (k ∈ K) follow the same distribution, and hence
both functions f (·) and F (·) are independent of index k. We will study
problem with the non-identical variable rk in our future work.
10As we will show in the analysis, the APOs make their decisions based on
the LTE provider’s reserve rate C instead of the throughput RLTE. In other
words, the APOs do not need to know the value of RLTE. Therefore, we do
not need to assume a probability distribution of RLTE to model the APOs’
knowledge of RLTE.
to denote the LTE’s and the APO’s data rate discounting
factors, respectively;11
-cooperation mode: the LTE provider reaches an agreement
with APO k ∈ K, where APO k stops transmission and the
LTE provider exclusively occupies channel k. In this case,
there is no co-channel interference, and the LTE provider’s
data rate is simply RLTE. As a compensation, the LTE provider
will serve APO k’s users with a guaranteed data rate rpay ∈
[0, RLTE].12 The remaining K − 1 APOs occupy their own
channels, and are not interfered by the LTE provider. Which
APO the LTE provider chooses to cooperate with and what
the value rpay should be will be determined through a reverse
auction design in the next subsection.
B. Second-Price Reverse Auction Design
We design a second-price reverse auction, where the LTE
provider is the auctioneer (buyer) and the APOs are the bidders
(sellers). The auction is held at the beginning of each time slot.
The private type of APO k is rk (i.e., the data rate when it
exclusively occupies channel k), and APO k’s item for sale is
the right of onloading APO k’s traffic. When the LTE provider
obtains the item from APO k, the LTE provider can onload
APO k’s traffic and exclusively occupy channel k. Since we
assume that the LTE provider cannot occupy more than one
channel at the same time, the LTE provider is only interested
in obtaining one item from one of the APOs.13 Different from
the conventional reverse auction where the auctioneer pays
the winner money to obtain the item, here the LTE serves the
winning APO’s users with the rate rpay as the payment.
Reserve Rate and Bids: In Stage I of the auction, the
LTE provider announces its reserve rate C ∈ [0,∞), which
corresponds to the maximum data rate that it is willing to
accept to serve the winning APO’s users. In Stage II of the
auction, after observing the reserve rate C, APO k submits a
bid bk ∈ [0, C] ∪ {“N”}: (a) bk ∈ [0, C] indicates the data
rate that APO k requests the LTE provider to serve APO k’s
users; (b) bk = “N” means that APO k does not want to
sell its item (i.e., the right of onloading APO k’s traffic) to
11Based on [11], [20], [21], the data rate reduction of the APO due to the
co-channel interference is much heavier than that of the LTE. Hence, factor
ηAPO is usually smaller than δLTE. The values of ηAPO and δLTE depend
on the concrete coexistence mechanisms and settings. For example, the study
in [11] showed that ηAPO ranges from 0.1 to 0.5 given different LTE off time
under the CSAT mechanism. In this work, we assume that the LTE provider
adopts the same mechanism (e.g., CSAT or LBT) and settings (e.g., LTE off
time in CSAT) when coexisting with any APO. Hence, the LTE provider has
the same discounting factor δLTE for the coexistence with any APO, and the
APOs have the same discounting factor ηAPO.
12According to [2], in 2015, 88% of global mobile devices are the mobile
phones (including the smartphones, non-smartphones, and phablets), which
have the cellular interfaces. Only 12% of global mobile devices are the tablets,
laptops, and other devices that may not have the cellular interfaces. Therefore,
we assume that all the mobile devices served by the APOs (during the
considered time slot) have the cellular interfaces and hence can be onloaded
to the LTE network if needed. In Section VI-B, we will discuss the extension
to the scenario where some mobile devices (e.g., laptops) do not have the
cellular interfaces.
13Since the LTE unlicensed technology is still in an early stage of
development, the existing relevant experiments and studies focused on the
situation where the LTE network can only utilize a single unlicensed channel
[6], [9], [11]. In the future, it is likely that the LTE network can aggregate
multiple unlicensed channels through the carrier aggregation technology [34].
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Fig. 1: Illustration of The Reverse Auction.
the LTE provider.14 We define the vector of APOs’ bids as
b , (bk,∀k ∈ K). The auction design is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Auction Outcomes: Next we discuss the auction outcomes
based on the different values of b and C. For ease of
exposition, we define the comparison between “N” and any
bid bk as
min {“N”, bk} =
{
bk, if bk ∈ [0, C] ,
“N”, if bk = “N”.
(1)
Furthermore, we use Imin to denote the set of APOs with the
minimum bid, and define it as
Imin ,
{
i ∈ K : i = arg min
k∈K
bk
}
. (2)
The auction has the following possible outcomes:
(a) When |Imin| = 1,15 then APO i = arg mink∈K bk is
the winner, and leaves channel i to the LTE provider. The
LTE provider works in the cooperation mode and exclusively
occupies channel i. Furthermore, the LTE serves APO i’s users
with a rate rpay = min {C, b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bK}, which
is the lowest rate among the reserve rate and all the other
APOs’ bids, based on the rule of the second-price auction. In
this case, the allocated rate rpay is greater than the winning
APO’s bid (i.e., mink∈K bk);
(b) When mink∈K bk ∈ [0, C] and |Imin| > 1, the LTE
provider works in the cooperation mode, randomly chooses an
APO from set Imin with the probability 1|Imin| to exclusively
occupy the corresponding channel, and serves the APO’s users
with a rate rpay = mink∈K bk. In this case, the allocated rate
rpay equals the winning APO’s bid;
(c) When mink∈K bk = “N”,16 the LTE provider works
in the competition mode, randomly chooses one of the K
channels with the probability 1K , and shares the channel with
14If APO k bids any value greater than the reserve rate C, the LTE provider
will not cooperate with APO k based on the definition of C. Hence, any bid
greater than C leads to the same result to APO k. In order to facilitate the
description, we use “N” to represent any bid greater than C. Intuitively, if the
reserve rate C is very small, APO k is more likely to bid “N”. In this case,
APO k can achieve an expected data rate (considering all possible auction
results) higher than that when onloading the users to the LTE provider.
15Condition |Imin| = 1 implies mink∈K bk ∈ [0, C] as we have K ≥ 2
APOs.
16In this case, all APOs bid “N”.
the corresponding APO.17
C. LTE Provider’s Payoff
Based on the summary of auction outcomes in the last
subsection, we can write rpay as a function of b and C:
rpay (b, C) = min{C,mink 6=i,k∈K bk}, if |Imin| = 1,mink∈K bk, if mink∈Kbk∈ [0,C] and |Imin|>1,
0, if mink∈K bk = “N”.
(3)
We define the LTE provider’s payoff as the data rate that it
can allocate to its own users, and compute it as:18
ΠLTE (b, C) =
{
RLTE − rpay (b, C) , if mink∈K bk ∈ [0, C] ,
δLTERLTE, if mink∈K bk = “N”.
(4)
Equation (4) captures two possible situations: (a) when the
minimum bid lies in [0, C], the LTE provider works in the
cooperation mode, exclusively occupies a channel, and obtains
a total data rate of RLTE. Since the LTE provider needs to
allocate a rate of rpay (b, C) to the winning APO’s users, its
payoff is RLTE − rpay (b, C); (b) when all APOs bid “N”,
the LTE provider works in the competition mode, and δLTE ∈
(0, 1) captures the discount in the LTE provider’s data rate due
to the interference from the Wi-Fi APO in the same channel.
D. APOs’ Payoffs and Allocative Externalities
We define the payoff of APO k ∈ K as the data rate that its
users receive: when APO k cooperates with the LTE provider,
these users are served by the LTE provider; otherwise, they are
served by APO k. Based on the summary of auction outcomes
in Section II-B and the definition of rpay (b, C) in (3), we
summarize APO k’s expected payoff as follows:
ΠAPOk (b, C) =
rk, if bk > minj∈K bj ,
1
|Imin|rpay (b, C)+
|Imin|−1
|Imin| rk, if bk=minj∈K bj ∈ [0, C] ,
K−1+ηAPO
K rk, if minj∈K bj = “N”.
(5)
Equation (5) summarizes three possible situations: (a) when
bk > minj∈K bj , the LTE provider exclusively occupies a
channel from one of the APOs (other than APO k) with the
minimum bid. As a result, APO k can exclusively occupy its
own channel k, and serve its users with rate rk; (b) when
bk = minj∈K bj ∈ [0, C], the LTE provider cooperates with
APO k and one of the other APOs with the minimum bid
with the probability 1|Imin| and the probability 1 − 1|Imin|
(1 ≤ |Imin| ≤ K), respectively. Hence, APO k’s users
receive rate rpay (b, C) and rate rk with the probability
1
|Imin| and the probability 1 − 1|Imin| , respectively. In this
case, the expected data rate that APO k’s users receive is
1
|Imin|rpay (b, C) +
|Imin|−1
|Imin| rk,; (c) when minj∈K bj = “N”,
17Because the LTE provider does not have the private information rk , it
cannot differentiate the channels. We consider a specific protocol where the
LTE provider randomly accesses each channel with an equal probability in
the competition mode.
18Notice that mink∈K bk ∈ [0, C] contains two possible situations: (i)
|Imin| = 1; (ii) mink∈K bk ∈ [0, C] and |Imin| > 1.
6TABLE I: Main Notations
K,K The set of APOs and its cardinality
rk APO k’s throughput without interference (pri-
vate valuation, also called type)
rmin, rmax Lower and upper bounds of rk, k ∈ K
f (·), F (·) PDF and CDF of rk, k ∈ K
RLTE LTE provider’s throughput without interference
ηAPO APOs’ data rate discounting factor
δLTE LTE provider’s data rate discounting factor
C LTE provider’s reserve rate (decision variable)
bk APO k’s bid (decision variable)
Imin The set of APOs with the minimum bid
ΠLTE (b, C) LTE provider’s payoff
rpay (b, C) Data rate LTE allocates to the winning APO
ΠAPOk (b, C) APO k’s payoff
there is no winner in the auction, and the LTE provider
randomly chooses one of the K channels to coexist with the
corresponding APO. With the probability 1K , APO k coexists
with the LTE provider and has a data rate of ηAPOrk; with the
probability 1− 1K , APO k has a data rate of rk by exclusively
occupying channel k. In this case, the expected data rate that
APO k’s users receive is K−1+η
APO
K rk.
We note that APO k does not win the auction in either of the
following two cases: bk > minj∈K bj and minj∈K bj = “N”.
However, the APO k’s payoff is different in these two cases: it
obtains a payoff of rk when bk > minj∈K bj , and achieves a
smaller payoff of K−1+η
APO
K rk when minj∈K bj = “N”. That
is to say, even if APO k does not win the auction, it is more
willing to see the other APOs winning (i.e., bk > minj∈K bj)
rather than losing the auction (i.e., minj∈K bj = “N”). This
shows positive allocative externalities of the auction, which
make our problem substantially different from conventional
auction problems. At the equilibrium of the conventional
second-price auction, bidders bid truthfully according to their
private values, regardless of other bidders’ valuations. With
allocative externalities in our problem, when APO k evaluates
its payoff when losing the auction, it needs to consider
whether the other APOs win the auction or not. Hence, the
distributions of the other APOs’ valuations (types) affect APO
k’s strategy. As we will show in the following sections, this
leads to a special structure of APOs’ bidding strategies at the
equilibrium, and bidding truthfully is no longer a dominate
strategy.
We summarize the main notations in Table I. For the
parameters and distributions that characterize the APOs, rk is
APO k’s private information, and the remaining information,
i.e., K, rmin, rmax, f (·) , F (·) , and ηAPO, is publicly known
to all the APOs and the LTE provider. For the parameters that
characterize the LTE provider, i.e., RLTE and δLTE, as we will
see in later sections, they will not affect the APOs’ strategies.
Therefore, they can be either known or unknown to the APOs.
Next we analyze the auction by backward induction. In
Section III, we analyze the APOs’ equilibrium strategies in
Stage II, given the LTE provider’s reserve rate C in Stage I. In
Section IV, we analyze the LTE provider’s equilibrium reserve
rate C∗ in Stage I by anticipating the APOs’ equilibrium
strategies in Stage II.
III. STAGE II: APOS’ EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGIES
In this section, we assume that the reserve rate C of the LTE
provider in Stage I is given, and analyze the APOs’ equilib-
rium strategies in Stage II. In Section III-A, we define the
equilibrium for the APOs under a given C. In Sections III-B,
III-C, III-D, and III-E, we analyze the APOs’ equilibrium
strategies by considering different intervals of C. In Section
III-F, we summarize the results for the APOs’ equilibrium
strategies.
A. Definition of Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We focus on the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(SBNE), which is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Under a reserve rate C, a bidding strategy
function b∗ (r, C), r ∈ [rmin, rmax], constitutes a symmet-
ric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if relation (6) holds for all
sk ∈ [0, C] ∪ {“N”}, all rk ∈ [rmin, rmax], and all k ∈ K.
Since it is the symmetric equilibrium, all the APOs apply
the same bidding strategy function b∗ (r, C) at the equilibrium.
The left hand side of inequality (6) stands for APO k’s ex-
pected payoff when it bids b∗ (rk, C). The expectation is taken
with respect to r−k , (rj ,∀j 6= k, j ∈ K), which denotes all
the other APOs’ types and is unknown to APO k. Inequality
(6) implies that APO k ∈ K cannot improve its expected
payoff by unilaterally changing its bid from b∗ (rk, C) to any
sk ∈ [0, C] ∪ {“N”}.
B. APOs’ Equilibrium When C ∈ [rmin, rmax)
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from
[rmin, rmax),19 and show the unique form of bidding strategy
that constitutes an SBNE. We first introduce the following
lemma (the proofs of all lemmas and theorems can be found
in the appendix).
Lemma 1. The following equation admits at least one solution
r in (C, rmax):
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (r)− F (C))n (1− F (r))K−1−n C − r
n+ 1
+ (1− F (r))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
r
)
= 0, (7)
where F (·) is the CDF of random variable rk,
k ∈ K. We denote the solutions r in (C, rmax) as
rt1 (C) , r
t
2 (C) , . . . , r
t
M (C), where M = 1, 2, . . . , is
the number of solutions.
Based on the definition of rt1 (C) , r
t
2 (C) , . . . , r
t
M (C) in
Lemma 1, we introduce the following theorem.
19We first analyze the case where C ∈ [rmin, rmax), because it has
the most complicated equilibrium analysis. We can apply a similar analysis
approach in this section to the other cases.
7Er−k
{
ΠAPOk ((b
∗ (r1, C) , . . . , b∗ (rk−1, C) , b∗ (rk, C) , b∗ (rk+1, C) , . . . , b∗ (rK , C)) , C) |rk
} ≥
Er−k
{
ΠAPOk ((b
∗ (r1, C) , . . . , b∗ (rk−1, C) , sk, b∗ (rk+1, C) , . . . , b∗ (rK , C)) , C) |rk
}
, (6)
Theorem 1. Consider an rT (C) ∈ (C, rmax) that belongs to
the set of {rt1 (C) , rt2 (C) , . . . , rtM (C)}, then the following
bidding strategy b∗ constitutes an SBNE:
b∗ (rk, C) =

any value in [0,rmin], if rk = rmin,
rk, if rk ∈ (rmin, C],
C, if rk ∈ (C, rT (C)),
C or “N”, if rk = rT (C) ,
“N”, if rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax] ,
(8)
for all k ∈ K.
We illustrate the structure of strategy b∗ in Fig. 2, in which
we notice that
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Fig. 2: Bidding Strategy Structure at SBNE When C ∈ [rmin, rmax).
(a) For an APO k with type rk ∈ (rmin, C], it bids rk. In
other words, APO k requests the LTE provider to serve APO
k’s users with at least the rate that APO k can achieve by
exclusively occupying channel k;
(b) For an APO k with type rk ∈ (C, rT (C)), it bids
C. Since C < rk, the data rate APO k requests from the
LTE provider is smaller than the rate that APO k achieves by
exclusively occupying channel k. Recall that the feasible bid
should be from [0, C] ∪ {“N”}. If APO k bids “N”, there is
a chance that all the other APOs also bid “N”, which makes
the LTE provider work in the competition mode and leads to
a payoff of K−1+η
APO
K rk to APO k based on (5). In order to
avoid such a situation, APO k would bid C, and ensure that
its payoff is at least C;20
(c) For an APO k with type rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax], it
bids “N”. Similar as case (b), there is a chance that all the
other APOs also bid “N”, and APO k obtains a payoff of
K−1+ηAPO
K rk. However, with rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax], the value
K−1+ηAPO
K rk is already large enough so that there is no need
for APO k to lower its bid from “N” to any value from [0, C].
There are two special points in (8):
(d) For an APO k with rk = rmin, it has the same payoff if it
bids any value from [0, rmin]. This is because with probability
one, APO k wins the auction.21 From (3) and (5), APO k’s
20Specifically, based on (3), if APO k bids C and wins the auction, its
payoff will be C; if APO k bids C but loses the auction, its payoff will be
rk > C.
21Notice that for any APO j 6= k, j ∈ K, the probability that rj =
rmin is zero based on the continuous distribution of rj . In other words, with
probability one, rj is from the interval (rmin, rmax]. Based on (8), APO
j 6= k bids from (rmin, C] ∪ {“N”} and APO k wins the auction.
payoff is min {C, b1, . . . , bk−1, bk+1, . . . , bK}, which does not
depend on APO k’s bid bk and is always no smaller than rmin;
(e) For an APO k with rk = rT (C), it has the same
expected payoff under bids C and “N”.
It is easy to show that b∗ (rk, C) in (8) is not a dominant
strategy for the APOs. For example, if APO k’s type rk ∈
(C, rT (C)) and minj∈K,j 6=k bj = C, bidding “N” generates
a larger payoff to APO k than bidding b∗ (rk, C) = C. This
result is different from that of the conventional second-price
auction, where bidding the truthful valuation constitutes an
equilibrium, and is also the weakly dominant strategy for the
bidders.
Notice that equation (7) may admit multiple solutions, i.e.,
M > 1. Based on Theorem 1, each solution rtm, m =
1, 2, . . . ,M , corresponds to a strategy b∗ defined in (8).
In the following theorem, we show the unique form of
bidding strategy under an SBNE.
Theorem 2. The strategy function in (8) is the unique form
of bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE.
The sketch of the proof is as follows: first, we show the
necessary conditions that a bidding strategy needs to satisfy
to constitute an SBNE; second, we show that the function in
(8) is the only function that satisfies all these conditions. We
leave the detailed proof in Appendices VIII-C and VIII-D.
C. APOs’ Equilibrium When C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from interval[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
, and summarize the form of the bidding
strategy at the SBNE in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. When C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
)
, there is a
unique SBNE, where b∗ (rk, C) = “N”, k ∈ K, for all
rk ∈ [rmin, rmax]; when C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin, a strategy
function constitutes an SBNE if and only if it is in the following
form:
b∗ (rk, C)=
{
any value in [0,C] or “N”, if rk = rmin,
“N”, if rk∈ (rmin,rmax] .
(9)
When C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
, the LTE provider only
wants to allocate a limited data rate to the winning APO’s
users. In this case, the APOs bid “N” with probability one.22
D. APOs’ Equilibrium When C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from interval(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
, and show that the bidding strategy
22In Theorem 3, when C = K−1+η
APO
K
rmin, the APO with type rmin
can bid any value. However, the probability for an APO to have the type rmin
is zero due to the continuous distribution of r.
8that constitutes an SBNE has a unique form. First, we intro-
duce the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The following equation admits at least one solution
r in (rmin, rmax):
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
Fn (r) (1− F (r))K−1−n C − r
n+ 1
+ (1− F (r))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
r
)
= 0, (10)
where F (·) is the CDF of random variable rk,
k ∈ K. We denote the solutions r in (rmin, rmax) as
rx1 (C) , r
x
2 (C) , . . . , r
x
L (C), where L = 1, 2, . . . , is the
number of solutions.
Based on the definition of rx1 (C) , r
x
2 (C) , . . . , r
x
L (C) in
Lemma 2, we introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 4. When C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
, con-
sider an rX (C) ∈ (rmin, rmax) that belongs to the set
of {rx1 (C) , rx2 (C) , . . . , rxL (C)}, then the following bidding
strategy b∗ constitutes an SBNE:
b∗ (rk, C) =
 C, if rk ∈ [rmin, rX (C)),C or “N”, if rk = rX (C) ,
“N”, if rk ∈ (rX (C) , rmax] ,
(11)
where k ∈ K. Furthermore, such a bidding strategy b∗ is the
unique form of bidding strategy that constitutes an SBNE.
The bidding strategy in (11) is similar to that in (8), except
that here it only has two regions instead of three regions.
Specifically, here there are no APOs that bid their types rk.
This is because here the reserve rate C is smaller than rmin,
hence bidding any type rk ∈ [rmin, rmax] is not feasible. We
illustrate the structure of strategy function b∗ in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: Bidding Strategy Structure at SBNE When C ∈(
K−1+ηAPO
K
rmin, rmin
)
.
Similar as the equilibrium analysis for C ∈ [rmin, rmax),
here equation (10) may admit multiple solutions, i.e., L > 1,
in which case each solution rxl , l = 1, 2, . . . , L, corresponds
to a strategy b∗ defined in (11).
E. APOs’ Equilibrium When C ∈ [rmax,∞)
We assume that the reserve rate C is given from interval
C ∈ [rmax,∞), and show the unique form of bidding strategy
that constitutes an SBNE in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. When C ∈ [rmax,∞), a strategy function
constitutes an SBNE if and only if it is in the following form
(k ∈ K):
b∗(rk,C)=
 any value in [0,rmin], if rk = rmin,rk, if rk∈(rmin,rmax),
any value in [rmax,C]∪{“N”}, if rk = rmax.
(12)
When C ∈ [rmax,∞), the LTE provider is willing to
allocate a large data rate to the winning APO’s users. Based on
(12), all APOs bid values from [0, C] with probability one.23
F. Summary of APOs’ Equilibriums
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Fig. 4: APOs’ Strategies under Different C.
Based on Sections III-B, III-C, III-D, and III-E, there is
always a unique form of APO k’s bidding strategy b∗ (rk, C)
at the SBNE for any reserve rate C ∈ [0,∞). We summarize
the APOs’ strategies under different intervals of C in Fig.
4.24 We find that some APO types bid the reserve rate C in
Fig. 4 when C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmax
)
. This is due to the
unique feature of the auction with allocative externalities: first,
if none of the other APOs submits its bid from interval [0, C],
these types of APOs prefer to cooperate with the LTE provider
rather than to interfere with the LTE in the competition mode;
second, if at least one of the other APOs submits its bid from
interval [0, C], these types of APOs prefer to occupy their own
channels rather than to cooperate with the LTE provider, as
the LTE will not generate interference to their channels in this
case. The first reason motivates these APO types to bid from
interval [0, C], and the second reason motivates these APO
types to reduce their chances of winning the auction as much
as possible. As a result, these APO types bid the reserve rate
C at the equilibrium.
IV. STAGE I: LTE PROVIDER’S RESERVE RATE
In this section, we analyze the LTE provider’s optimal
reserve rate by anticipating APOs’ equilibrium strategies in
Stage II. In Section IV-A, we define the LTE provider’s ex-
pected payoff. In Section IV-B, we compute the LTE provider’s
expected payoff based on different intervals of C. In Section
IV-C, we formulate the LTE provider’s payoff maximization
problem. In Section IV-D, we analyze the LTE provider’s
optimal reserve rate C∗.
A. Definition of LTE Provider’s Expected Payoff
We first make the following assumption on the CDF of an
APO’s type.
Assumption 1. Under the cumulative distribution function
F (·), (a) equation (7) has a unique solution in (C, rmax),
23Notice that the probability for an APO to have the type rmax is zero due
to the continuous distribution of r.
24When C ∈ [rmin, rmax), an APO with type rk = rmin can bid any
value from [0, rmin] at the equilibrium based on (8). Since the probability
for an APO to have the type rmin is zero, the strategy of this particular APO
type is not shown in Fig. 4.
9i.e., M = 1, and (b) equation (10) has a unique solution in
(rmin, rmax), i.e., L = 1.
Assumption 1 implies that rT (C) and rX (C) are unique.
Such an assumption is mild. When K = 2, we have proved
that Assumption 1 holds for the uniform distribution. For a
general K, we have run simulation and shown that Assumption
1 holds for both the uniform distribution and truncated normal
distribution. The details of the proof and simulation can be
found in Appendices VIII-I and VIII-J, respectively.
Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the uniqueness of
rT (C) implies the unique expression of APOs’ bidding strat-
egy b∗ for C ∈ [rmin, rmax). Similarly, from Theorem 4, the
uniqueness of rX (C) implies the unique expression of strategy
b∗ for C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
.
We define the LTE provider’s expected payoff as
Π¯LTE(C),Er
{
ΠLTE((b∗(r1, C) , . . . , b∗(rK , C)),C)
}
, (13)
where r , (rk,∀k ∈ K) denotes the types of all APOs, and
b∗ (rk, C), k ∈ K, is given in (8), (9), (11), and (12) based on
the different intervals of C.
B. Computation of LTE Provider’s Expected Payoff
Since b∗ (rk, C) in (13) has different expressions for four
different intervals of C, we characterize Π¯LTE (C) based on
these four intervals of C.
1) C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
: The APOs submit their
bids according to strategy b∗ in (9). It is easy to find that
b∗ (rk, C) = “N” with probability one for all k ∈ K, and
hence the LTE provider always works in the competition mode.
Based on (4), we can compute Π¯LTE (C) as
Π¯LTE (C) = δLTERLTE. (14)
2) C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
: The APOs’ bidding strat-
egy is summarized in (11). Hence, the probabilities for an
APO with a random type to bid C and “N” are F (rX (C))
and 1− F (rX (C)), respectively. Therefore, we can compute
Π¯LTE (C) as
Π¯LTE (C) = (1− F (rX (C)))K δLTERLTE+(
1− (1− F (rX (C)))K
)
(RLTE − C) . (15)
That is to say: (a) when all the APOs bid “N”, the LTE
provider works in the competition mode, and obtains a payoff
of δLTERLTE; (b) when at least one APO bids C, the LTE
provider works in the cooperation mode, and allocates a rate
of C to the winning APO’s users.
3) C ∈ [rmin, rmax): The APOs’ strategy is given in (8).
We can compute Π¯LTE (C) as
Π¯LTE (C) = (1− F (rT (C)))K δLTERLTE+(
1− (1− F (rT (C)))K
)
RLTE − r¯pay (C) .
(16)
Here, r¯pay (C) is defined as the expected data rate that the
LTE provider allocates to the winning APO’s users, and is
given as (the details of computing r¯pay (C) can be found in
Appendix VIII-K)
r¯pay (C) ,K (K − 1)
∫ C
rmin
rf (r)F (r) (1− F (r))K−2 dr
+KCF (C) (1− F (C))K−1
+ C
(
(1− F (C))K − (1− F (rT (C)))K
)
.
(17)
4) C ∈ [rmax,∞): Based on (12), the APOs bid values
from [0, C] with probability one, and the LTE provider al-
ways works in the cooperation mode. Then we can compute
Π¯LTE (C) as
Π¯LTE (C) = RLTE
−K (K − 1)
∫ rmax
rmin
rf (r)F (r) (1− F (r))K−2 dr. (18)
C. LTE Provider’s Payoff Maximization Problem
Based on Π¯LTE (C) derived in Section IV-B, we can verify
that Π¯LTE (C) is continuous for C ∈ [0,∞). The LTE provider
determines the optimal reserve rate by solving
max
C∈[0,∞)
Π¯
LTE
(C) s.t. bmax (C) ≤ RLTE, (19)
where we define
bmax (C) , max {b∗ (rk, C) ∈ [0, C] : rk ∈ [rmin, rmax]} ,
(20)
which is the maximum possible bid (except “N”) from the
APOs at the SBNE under C. Constraint bmax (C) ≤ RLTE
ensures that the LTE provider has enough capacity to satisfy
the bid from the winning APO.
D. LTE Provider’s Optimal Reserve Rate
In the following theorem, we characterize the optimal
reserve rate C∗ that solves problem (19) for a general dis-
tribution function F (·) that satisfies Assumption 1.
Theorem 6. The LTE provider’s optimal reserve rate C∗
satisfies the following properties:
(1) When RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, C
∗ can be any value from[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
;
(2) When K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin <RLTE ≤rmax, C∗ can be chosen
from
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin,RLTE
]
;
(3) When RLTE > max
{
rmax,
K−1+ηAPO
K(1−δLTE) rmin
}
, C∗ can be
chosen from
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin,rmax
]
.
When RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, the LTE provider does
not have enough capacity to satisfy any APO’s request.
Specifically, RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin is equivalent to(
1− δLTE)RLTE ≤ K−1+ηAPOK rmin. Here, (1− δLTE)RLTE
stands for the additional increase in the LTE network’s capac-
ity when it works in the cooperation mode. Based on (8), (9),
(11), and (12), K−1+η
APO
K rmin is the lower bound of the data
rate that any APO with type in (rmin, rmax] may request from
the LTE provider. Therefore, when RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin,
10
the additional gain in the LTE network’s capacity under
cooperation cannot cover the request from any APO, and the
LTE provider sets C∗ ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
to work in the
competition mode.
When K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin < RLTE ≤ rmax, the LTE network’s
capacity can cover the requests from the APOs that bid
small values. Hence, the LTE provider chooses C∗ above
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin to accept these APOs’ bids. Meanwhile, the
LTE provider has to choose C∗ no larger than RLTE, otherwise
it does not have enough capacity to satisfy the APOs that bid
large values.
When RLTE > max
{
rmax,
K−1+ηAPO
K(1−δLTE) rmin
}
, since the
maximum possible bid from the APOs is rmax, the LTE
provider always has enough capacity to satisfy the APOs’
requests. In this case, the LTE provider chooses C∗ from(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmax
]
, and C∗ is no longer constrained by
the LTE throughput RLTE.
Next we discuss the choice of C∗ based on Theorem 6.
When RLTE≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, Theorem 6 indicates that any
value from interval
[
0,K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
is the optimal C∗ for
a general distribution function F (·). However, when RLTE >
K−1+ηAPO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, it is difficult to characterize the closed-form
expression of C∗ even under a specific function F (·). This
is because (i) it is difficult to solve equations (7) and (10)
and obtain the closed-form expressions of rT (C) and rX (C),
respectively, and (ii) the expression of Π¯LTE (C) in (16) is
complicated and hard to analyze. Therefore, we determine
the optimal C∗ numerically for RLTE > K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin.
Specifically, we have the following observation from the
simulation.
Observation 1. Π¯LTE (C) is strictly unimodal for C ∈(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmax
]
.
We have verified Observation 1 for the uniform distribution
function F (·) and the truncated normal distribution function
F (·). In Fig. 5, we illustrate an example of Π¯LTE (C), where
K = 2, δLTE = 0.4, ηAPO = 0.3, RLTE = 300 Mbps,
and rk ∈ [50 Mbps, 200 Mbps] follows a truncated nor-
mal distribution.25 Based on Theorem 6 and Observation
1, when K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin < RLTE ≤ rmax and RLTE >
max
{
rmax,
K−1+ηAPO
K(1−δLTE) rmin
}
, we can use the Golden Section
method [35] on interval
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, RLTE
]
and interval(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmax
]
, respectively, to determine the opti-
mal C∗.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first investigate the impacts of the
system parameters on the LTE’s optimal reserve rate, the LTE’s
expected payoff, and the APOs’ equilibrium strategies. Then
we compare our auction-based spectrum sharing scheme with a
25We choose RLTE = 300 Mbps because the peak LTE throughput ranges
from 250 Mbps to 370 Mbps based on [17]. Moreover, we choose ηAPO
smaller than δLTE, because the degeneration of Wi-Fi’s data rate due to
the co-channel interference is usually heavier than that of the LTE, as we
discussed in Section II.
state-of-the-art benchmark scheme. Specifically, we randomly
pick the APOs, and implement both schemes. We compare
several criteria (such as the LTE provider’s payoff, the APOs’
total payoff, and the social welfare) achieved by our auction-
based scheme and the benchmark scheme.
A. Influences of System Parameters
1) Influence of K: We first study the impact of the number
of APOs K on the LTE provider’s and APOs’ strategies. We
choose RLTE = 95 Mbps, δLTE = 0.4, and ηAPO = 0.3, and
assume that rk, k ∈ K, follows a truncated normal distribution.
Specifically, we obtain the distribution of rk by truncating the
normal distribution N (125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps2) to interval
[50 Mbps, 200 Mbps]. We change K from 2 to 7, and deter-
mine the corresponding optimal reserve rate C∗ numerically
based on the approach discussed in Section IV-D.
We plot C∗ against K in Fig. 6, and observe that C∗
increases with K. This is because that the probability of a
particular APO being interfered by the LTE in the competition
mode decreases with the number of APOs. Hence, the APOs
are less willing to cooperate with the LTE provider under a
larger K, and the LTE provider needs to increase C∗ to attract
the APOs.
In Fig. 6, we observe that C∗ ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
for 2 ≤ K ≤ 4. Based on (11), in this case, APOs with
types in [rmin, rX (C∗)) and (rX (C∗) , rmax] bid C∗ and “N”,
respectively. To study the impact of K on the APOs’ strategies,
we plot rX (C∗) for 2 ≤ K ≤ 4 in Fig. 6. We observe that
rX (C
∗) decreases with K. This means that when K increases
from 2 to 4, more APOs bid “N” instead of C∗. On the
other hand, we find that C∗ ∈ [rmin, rmax) for 5 ≤ K ≤ 7.
Based on (8), in this case, APOs with types in [C∗, rT (C∗))
and (rT (C∗) , rmax] bid C∗ and “N”, respectively. We plot
rT (C
∗) for 5 ≤ K ≤ 7, and observe that rT (C∗) decreases
with K. Since C∗ increases with K, it is easy to conclude
that when K increases from 5 to 7, fewer APOs bid C∗,
and more APOs bid “N”. Combining the observations for
2 ≤ K ≤ 4 and 5 ≤ K ≤ 7, we summarize that the increase
of K makes more APOs switch from bidding C∗ to bidding
“N”. The reason is that each APO has a smaller chance to
be interfered by the LTE in the competition mode under a
larger K. Therefore, the APOs with large rk are less willing
to cooperate with the LTE provider, and more APOs bid “N”
instead of C∗.
We summarize the observations for Fig. 6 as follows.
Observation 2. When the number of APOs increases, (i) the
LTE provider’s optimal reserve rate C∗ increases, and (ii)
more APOs switch from bidding C∗ to bidding “N”.
Next we study the impact of K on the LTE provider’s
expected payoff Π¯LTE (C∗). The settings of δLTE and ηAPO,
and the distribution of rk are the same as those in Fig. 6. We
choose RLTE = 220 Mbps, 240 Mbps, and 260 Mbps, and
plot the corresponding Π¯LTE (C∗) against K in Fig. 7. We
observe that Π¯LTE (C∗) increases with K for these values of
RLTE. Moreover, we choose RLTE = 90 Mbps, 110 Mbps,
and 130 Mbps, and plot the corresponding Π¯LTE (C∗) against
11
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Fig. 9: Impacts of RLTE, δLTE, and ηAPO on
C∗.
K in Fig. 8. Different from Fig. 7, we find that Π¯LTE (C∗)
does not significantly change with K in Fig. 8. To understand
the difference between Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we notice that
the increase of K has the following two opposite impacts
on Π¯LTE (C∗): (i) the probability for the LTE provider to
find an APO with a small bid increases, which potentially
increases Π¯LTE (C∗); (ii) more APOs bid “N” instead of C∗
(Observation 2), which potentially decreases Π¯LTE (C∗). In
Fig. 7, the values of RLTE are large, and the LTE provider
can set large reserve rates C∗ to attract the APOs. In this
situation, the interval of APO types that want to cooperate
with the LTE provider is large, and impact (i) plays a dominant
role. As a result, Π¯LTE (C∗) increases with K in Fig. 7. On
the other hand, the values of RLTE are small in Fig. 8, and the
LTE provider can only choose small reserve rates C∗. Hence,
the interval of APO types that want to cooperate with the
LTE provider is small. In this situation, impact (ii) becomes
as important as impact (i). As a result, Π¯LTE (C∗) does not
significantly change with K in Fig. 8.
We summarize the following observations for Fig. 7 and
Fig. 8.
Observation 3. When the LTE provider has a large throughput
RLTE, its expected payoff Π¯LTE (C∗) increases with K;
otherwise, Π¯LTE (C∗) does not significantly change with K.
2) Influences of RLTE, δLTE, and ηAPO: We investigate
the impacts of parameters RLTE, δLTE, and ηAPO on C∗.
We choose K = 4, and the distribution of rk is the same as
that in Fig. 6. We consider four pairs of data rate discounting
factors:
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
= (0.4, 0.7) , (0.4, 0.3) , (0.4, 0.1), and
(0.6, 0.3). For each pair of
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
, we change RLTE
from 10 Mbps to 250 Mbps, and determine the corresponding
C∗ numerically. In Fig. 9, we plot C∗ against RLTE under the
different pairs of
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
.
Under all four settings, we observe that C∗ does not change
with RLTE when RLTE is below K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin. In this case,
the LTE provider does not have enough capacity to satisfy
the APOs’ requests. Based on Theorem 6, it chooses a small
reserve rate, and works in the competition mode. When RLTE
is above K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, C
∗ increases with RLTE. This is
because with a larger throughput RLTE, the LTE provider is
able to allocate a larger data rate to the winning APO, and
hence it increases the reserve rate C∗ to attract the APOs.
With δLTE = 0.4, we find that C∗ increases with ηAPO (see
the top three curves). This is because under a larger ηAPO, the
APOs are less heavily interfered by the LTE, and hence are
less willing to cooperate with the LTE provider. As a result,
the LTE provider needs to increase its reserve rate to attract
the APOs.
With ηAPO = 0.3, we find that C∗ under δLTE = 0.4 is no
smaller than that under δLTE = 0.6. Under a smaller δLTE,
the LTE provider is more heavily affected by the interference
from Wi-Fi. In this case, the LTE provider chooses a larger
reserve rate C∗ to motivate the cooperation with the APOs.
Furthermore, compared with ηAPO, we find that the difference
in δLTE leads to a larger difference in C∗, which shows that
δLTE has a larger impact on C∗ than ηAPO.
We summarize the observations in Fig. 9 as follows.
Observation 4. The optimal reserve rate C∗ is non-decreasing
in RLTE, increasing in ηAPO, and non-increasing in δLTE.
Moreover, δLTE has a larger impact on C∗ than ηAPO.
B. Comparison with The Benchmark Scheme
In this section, we compare our auction-based spectrum
sharing scheme with a benchmark scheme. Given a set K of
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APOs, the two schemes work as follows:
• Our auction-based scheme: First, the LTE provider deter-
mines C∗ numerically based on the approach in Section
IV-D. Second, each APO k ∈ K submits its bid based
on the equilibrium strategy b∗ (rk, C∗) in Section III.
Third, the LTE provider determines its working mode,
the winning APO, and the allocated rate based on the
auction rule in Section II-B.
• Benchmark scheme: The LTE provider randomly shares
a channel with one of the K APOs.26
For a particular set of APOs, we denote the LTE provider’s
payoff under our auction-based and the benchmark schemes
as piLTEa and pi
LTE
b , respectively.
27 Furthermore, we denote the
APOs’ total payoff under our auction-based and the benchmark
schemes as piAPOa and pi
APO
b , respectively. For a given set
of APOs, we compute the relative performance gains of our
auction-based scheme over the benchmark scheme in terms of
the LTE’s payoff and the APOs’ total payoff as
ρLTE , pi
LTE
a − piLTEb
piLTEb
and ρAPO , pi
APO
a − piAPOb
piAPOb
. (21)
1) Performance on Average ρLTE and ρAPO: We in-
vestigate the average ρLTE and ρAPO. We consider four
pairs of data rate discounting factors:
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
=
(0.4, 0.1) , (0.4, 0.3) , (0.4, 0.7), and (0.6, 0.3),28 and change
RLTE from 30 Mbps to 370 Mbps. The other settings are the
same as those in Fig. 9. Given a pair of
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
and a
particular value of RLTE, we randomly choose rk, k ∈ K,
based on the truncated normal distribution, implement our
auction-based scheme and the benchmark scheme separately,
and record the corresponding values of ρLTE and ρAPO. For
each pair of
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
and each value of RLTE, we run
the experiment 20, 000 times, and obtain the corresponding
average values of ρLTE and ρAPO.
In Fig. 10, we plot the average ρLTE against RLTE for dif-
ferent
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
pairs. First, we observe that the average
ρLTE increases with RLTE. In particular, all the average ρLTE
with δLTE = 0.4 are above 70% for RLTE = 370 Mbps
(the maximum LTE throughput according to [17]). That is
to say, our auction-based scheme’s performance gain on the
LTE provider’s payoff is more significant for a larger RLTE.
The reason is that a larger RLTE enables the LTE provider
to set a larger reserve rate, which increases the probability
for the cooperation between the LTE provider and the APOs.
Second, when ηAPO = 0.3 and δLTE increases from 0.4 to 0.6,
the average ρLTE decreases significantly. Since a larger δLTE
implies that the coexistence with Wi-Fi reduces the LTE’s
payoff less significantly, the cooperation with Wi-Fi is less
26The existing studies focused on the LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence [26], [27],
and there are no results studying the cooperation between the two types of
networks. Hence, we represent the state-of-the-art solution by the benchmark
scheme, where the LTE coexists with Wi-Fi. Since the LTE provider does
not know the private information rk , it cannot differentiate the channels.
Therefore, in the benchmark scheme, the LTE provider will randomly pick a
channel to coexist with the corresponding APO.
27Note that Π¯LTE (C∗) is the expectation of piLTEa with respect to the
APO types.
28In a practical implementation, the values of δLTE and ηAPO depend on
the applied coexistence mechanism (e.g., LBT or CSAT) and the correspond-
ing settings (e.g., LTE off time in CSAT).
beneficial to the LTE provider, which decreases the average
ρLTE. Third, when δLTE = 0.4 and ηAPO changes from 0.1
to 0.7, the change in the average ρLTE is small. Hence, ηAPO
has a smaller impact on the average ρLTE comparing with
δLTE. We summarize the observations in Fig. 10 as follows.
Observation 5. Compared with the benchmark scheme, our
auction-based scheme improves the LTE’s payoff by 70% on
average under a large RLTE and a small δLTE. Moreover, the
performance gain is not sensitive to ηAPO.
In Fig. 11, we plot the average ρAPO against RLTE for
different
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
pairs. First, we observe that the aver-
age ρAPO increases with RLTE. Similar as the explanation for
ρLTE, this is because a larger RLTE leads to a larger reserve
rate, and creates more cooperation opportunities between the
LTE provider and the APOs. Second, the average ρAPO is
large when both δLTE and ηAPO are small. In this case, there
is a heavy interference between the LTE and the APOs in the
competition mode, and the both of them want to avoid the
interference through the cooperation. Therefore, our auction-
based scheme is much more efficient, and achieves a large
ρAPO. We summarize the observations in Fig. 11 as follows.
Observation 6. Compared with the benchmark scheme, our
auction-based scheme is most beneficial to the APOs for a
large RLTE and small δLTE and ηAPO.
2) Performance on Social Welfare: We consider(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
= (0.4, 0.3), and choose the same settings as
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 for the other parameters. In Fig. 12, we
plot the average social welfares of the two schemes, and also
show the average value of the maximum social welfare. To
compute the maximum social welfare for a particular set of
APOs, we assume that there is a centralized decision maker,
who allocates K channels to the LTE provider and the K
APOs in a manner that maximizes the social welfare.29 For
each experiment, we randomly pick a set of APOs and record
the social welfare achieved by the centralized decision maker.
We run the experiment 20, 000 times, and obtain the average
value of the maximum social welfare.
When RLTE increases, the social welfare gain of our
auction-based scheme over the benchmark scheme increases,
and the average social welfare under our auction-based scheme
approaches the maximum social welfare. This is because when
RLTE is large, it is always good for the LTE to exclusively
occupy a channel to maximize the social welfare. For our
auction-based scheme, the increase of RLTE improves the
cooperation chance between the LTE and the APOs, and hence
increases the probability for the LTE to exclusively occupy a
channel. The result in Fig. 12 shows that in our auction-based
scheme, even the LTE provider and APOs make decisions to
maximize their own payoffs, and the LTE provider and each
APO do not have the complete information on the other APOs’
types, the eventual auction outcome leads to a close-to-optimal
29Specifically, the centralized decision maker can choose to: (i) keep the
LTE idle, and allocate all channels to the APOs, (ii) keep one APO idle, and
allocate all channels to the LTE and the remaining K−1 APOs, or (iii) let the
LTE share one channel with one APO, and allocate the remaining channels
to the remaining K − 1 APOs.
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Fig. 10: Comparison on LTE’s Payoff.
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Fig. 11: Comparison on APOs’ Payoffs.
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Fig. 12: Comparison on Social Welfare.
social welfare for a large RLTE. We summarize the observation
in Fig. 12 as follows.
Observation 7. Our auction-based scheme leads to a close-
to-optimal social welfare when RLTE is large.
VI. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND MODEL
EXTENSION
In this section, we first discuss the practical implemen-
tation of our auction framework. In particular, we explain
the approach for the LTE provider and APOs to exchange
information (e.g., reserve rate and bids). Then we discuss
some extensions of our model. Specifically, in Section VI-A,
we extend our model to the scenario where different APOs
can share the same channel. In Section VI-B, we consider a
scenario where some APOs’ traffic cannot be onloaded to the
LTE network. In Section VI-C, we extend our model to the
scenario where there are multiple LTE providers.
In a practical implementation, a centralized broker (e.g., a
private company or a company designated by the government)
can coordinate the interactions between the LTE provider and
APOs [13]. Next we briefly introduce the centralized broker
with an example from the TV white space networks, which
are in the process of commercial trials in the US and UK. In
the TV white space networks, a white space database operator
(e.g., Google, Microsoft, and SpectrumBridge) serves as the
broker to record and update the TV spectrum usage (by TV
stations) as well as the secondary access (by non-TV devices)
in the same area. Moreover, the broker controls the spectrum
allocated to different secondary service providers to avoid
the interference between the secondary service providers’ net-
works. This shows that it is possible to coordinate the spectrum
sharing of different networks through a broker, even if these
networks belong to different operators and have overlapping
coverages. In our auction framework, the LTE provider can
announce the reserve rate to the broker at the beginning of
each time slot. The APOs that are interested in participating
in the auction can communicate with the broker to obtain the
reserve rate information and submit their bids to the broker.30
Then the broker determines the winning APO based on our
auction rule, and broadcasts this result to the LTE provider
30In particular, when the APOs have multiple equilibrium strategies b∗
under the reserve rate (i.e., M > 1 or L > 1), the broker can coordinate the
APOs’ selection of the equilibrium strategy. Intuitively, the broker will suggest
the equilibrium strategy that maximizes the social welfare to the APOs. We
are interested in studying the details of this problem in our future work.
and APOs. With the broker’s help, the LTE provider does not
need to directly communicate with all surrounding APOs.
A. Extension: Channel Sharing Among APOs
In this section, we discuss the extension of our framework to
the scenario where different APOs can share the same channel.
In this scenario, the LTE provider still determines at most one
winning APO in each auction. The major challenge is that
when there are other APOs in the winning APO’s channel, the
LTE provider has to coexist with these remaining APOs (based
on the coexistence mechanisms like LBT and CSAT) after
onloading the winning APO’s traffic. Therefore, we need to (i)
extend the modeling of the LTE provider’s payoff, the APOs’
payoffs, and the APOs’ types, and (ii) modify the auction rule.
In the following, we briefly explain these two aspects.
For the modeling, we should first model the impact of the
number of APOs in the same channel on the LTE provider’s
and the APOs’ payoffs. Intuitively, the reductions in the LTE
provider’s and the APOs’ payoffs are more severe when
there are more APOs using the same channel. Second, we
should model the multi-dimensional APO type. In Section
II, we define the APO type as an APO’s throughput without
interference (i.e., rk). Here, an APO’s type should also include
the information of the number of APOs in the same channel.
In the equilibrium analysis, we can characterize the APOs’
equilibrium strategies by a function that maps an APO type
(i.e., throughput and number of APOs in the same channel) to
a bid.
For the auction rule, the major modification is the rule
of determining the winning APO. In Section II, the winning
APO is always the APO with the lowest bid. However, when
different APOs can share the same channel, such a rule is no
longer optimal for the LTE provider. This is because the APO
with the lowest bid may have many other APOs using the
same channel, and hence the benefit for the LTE provider to
cooperate with this APO may be small. Therefore, the LTE
provider has to consider both the APOs’ bids and the number
of APOs in each channel to determine the winning APO.
B. Extension: Complex APOs
In reality, some users’ mobile devices, such as the laptops,
do not have the LTE interfaces. The existence of these mobile
devices prevents the corresponding APOs from participating
in the auction and onloading all of their traffic to the LTE
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Fig. 13: An Example of Two LTE Providers.
network. For ease of exposition, we use the simple APOs
to represent the APOs who can onload all of their traffic to
the LTE network, and use the complex APOs to represent
the APOs who cannot onload all of their traffic to the LTE
network. The complex APOs will not participate in the auction
and will simply use their original channels. In the following,
we explain the impact of the consideration of complex APOs
on our analysis.
First, if all APOs occupy different channels (the assumption
in Section II), our current analysis can be directly extended
to the case where there are complex APOs. Notice that even
though the LTE provider can only cooperate with the simple
APOs in the cooperation mode, it can compete with both the
simple and complex APOs in the competition mode. Therefore,
the major change is that when the LTE provider works in the
competition mode, the expected payoff of an APO depends
on the number of all APOs (simple and complex APOs),
instead of the number of APOs participating in the auction
(simple APOs). Second, if different APOs can share the same
channel (the scenario in Section VI-A), it will be much more
challenging to consider the complex APOs in the analysis. This
is because the complex APOs may coexist with the simple
APOs in the same channel. In this situation, we need to
characterize a simple APO’s equilibrium strategy based on the
number of complex APOs as well as the number of simple
APOs in the APO’s channel.
C. Extension: Multiple LTE Providers
In this section, we discuss the extension of our framework
to the scenario where there are multiple LTE providers.
According to [6], the LTE networks of different providers can
well coexist with each other in the same unlicensed channel.
Hence, when there are multiple LTE providers, the focus of our
auction framework is still onloading the Wi-Fi APOs’ traffic
to the LTE networks.
When there are multiple LTE providers, they can take
turns to organize the auctions, which can be managed by
the centralized broker. Suppose that there are two LTE small
cell networks in the same area, and they are owned by LTE
provider A and LTE provider B, respectively. We illustrate
a protocol in Figure 13. During the odd number (2k + 1)-th
(k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}) time slot, LTE provider B directly operates
in the competition mode, and LTE provider A can send a
request to the broker and organize an auction. During the even
number (2k + 2)-th time slot, the two LTE providers switch
their roles: LTE provider A operates in the competition mode,
and LTE provider B can organize an auction. We can apply
similar protocols to the situations with more than two LTE
providers.
Since the protocol designs for the (2k + 1)-th time slot
and the (2k + 2)-th time slot are symmetric, next we only
introduce the protocol design for the (2k + 1)-th time slot. At
the beginning of the (2k + 1)-th time slot, LTE provider B
chooses the competition mode, i.e., it selects a channel and
coexists with the corresponding APOs. Then LTE provider A
organizes an auction: when no APO wants to cooperate with
LTE provider A, LTE provider A works in the competition
mode, selects a channel, and coexists with the corresponding
networks; otherwise, LTE provider A works in the cooperation
mode, onloads the winning APO’s traffic, and accesses the
corresponding channel. At the end of the (2k + 1)-th time
slot, both LTE provider A and LTE provider B release the
channels they use. In particular, LTE provider A also needs to
release the onloaded Wi-Fi users if LTE provider A works in
the cooperation mode during the (2k + 1)-th time slot.
Next we discuss the challenges of analyzing the scenario
with multiple LTE providers under the protocol we introduced
above. Briefly speaking, when a particular LTE provider
organizes an auction, it needs to consider the number of other
LTE providers in each channel. This is because the benefit for
the LTE provider to cooperate with an APO decreases with the
number of other LTE providers using the same channel. In the
analysis, we should characterize an APO’s equilibrium strategy
based on its throughput rk and the number of LTE providers in
the same channel. Furthermore, the auctioneer should consider
both the APOs’ bids and the number of LTE providers in each
channel to determine the winning APO. We provide a complete
analysis of the scenario where there are multiple LTE providers
in Section IX (supplementary materials).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a framework for LTE’s coope-
tition with Wi-Fi in the unlicensed spectrum. We designed a
reverse auction for the LTE provider to exclusively obtain the
channel from the APOs by onloading their traffic. Compared
with the existing LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence mechanisms like LBT
and CSAT, our auction can potentially avoid the interference
between the LTE and APOs. The analysis of the auction is
quite challenging as the designed auction involves positive
allocative externalities. We characterized the unique form of
the APOs’ bidding strategies at the equilibrium, and analyzed
the optimal reserve rate of the LTE provider. Numerical results
showed that our framework benefits both the LTE provider and
the APOs, and it achieves a close-to-optimal social welfare
under a large LTE throughput. In our framework, the LTE
provider announces the reserve rate and each APO then sub-
mits a bid at the beginning of each time slot, where the length
of each time slot corresponds to several minutes. Compared
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with the existing LTE/Wi-Fi coexistence mechanisms, our
auction framework leads to more signaling overhead. However,
if the LTE provider and an APO agree to cooperate, there is
no more need for the LTE to frequently sense the channel
activities, which removes the related operational overhead
during the rest of the time slot.31 Therefore, although our
framework generates more signaling overhead initially, it can
potentially significantly save the sensing cost (e.g., power) and
improve the payoffs of both LTE and Wi-Fi.
An interesting observation of our framework is that some-
times even if the cooperation mutually benefits the LTE
provider and the APOs, these two types of networks do not
reach an agreement on the cooperation. The reason is that
our framework considers an incomplete information setting.
For example, the LTE provider determines the reserve rate to
maximize its expected payoff by considering the distribution
of r (the vector of APOs’ types) instead of the actual value
of r. For some r, such a reserve rate may not be optimal
to the LTE provider and can make the LTE provider lose
some cooperation chances that mutually benefit both types
of networks (we provide an example in Appendix VIII-L).
Similarly, the incomplete information among the APOs can
also lead to the same inefficiency problem. In our future work,
we will consider other mechanisms (e.g., bargaining) for the
LTE/Wi-Fi coopetition to reduce such an inefficiency.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Yu, G. Iosifidis, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “Coopetition between
LTE unlicensed and Wi-Fi: A reverse auction with allocative externali-
ties,” in Proc. of IEEE WiOpt, Tempe, AZ, May 2016.
[2] Cisco, “Cisco visual networking index: Global mobile data traffic
forecast update, 2015-2020,” Tech. Rep., February 2016.
[3] 3GPP Study Item, RP-141397, “Study on Licensed-Assisted Access
using LTE,” September 2014.
[4] C. W. Kim, J. Ryoo, and M. M. Buddhikot, “Design and implementation
of an end-to-end architecture for 3.5 GHz shared spectrum,” in Proc. of
IEEE DySPAN, Stockholm, Sweden, September 2015, pp. 23–34.
[5] Senza Fili, “LTE unlicensed and Wi-Fi: Moving beyond coexistence,”
White Paper, 2015.
[6] LTE-U Forum, “LTE-U technical report: Coexistence study for LTE-U
SDL,” Tech. Rep., February 2015.
[7] http://www.lteuforum.org/.
[8] http://evolvemobile.org/.
[9] Qualcomm, “Making the best use of unlicensed spectrum for 1000x,”
White Paper, September 2015.
[10] Ericsson, “LTE release 13: Expanding the networked society,” White
Paper, April 2015.
[11] Google, “LTE and Wi-Fi in unlicensed spectrum: A coexistence study,”
Tech. Rep., June 2015.
[12] 4G Americas, “Integration of cellular and Wi-Fi networks,” White Paper,
September 2013.
[13] G. Iosifidis, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “A double-auction mech-
anism for mobile data-offloading markets,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 1634–1647, October 2015.
[14] L. Gao, G. Iosifidis, J. Huang, L. Tassiulas, and D. Li, “Bargaining-
based mobile data offloading,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 1114–1125, June 2014.
[15] W. Dong, S. Rallapalli, R. Jana, L. Qiu, K. Ramakrishnan, L. Razoumov,
Y. Zhang, and T. W. Cho, “iDEAL: Incentivized dynamic cellular of-
floading via auctions,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 22,
no. 4, pp. 1271–1284, August 2014.
31For example, in the LBT mechanism, the LTE senses the channel status
(busy or idle) every 20 microseconds; in the CSAT mechanism, the LTE
senses the Wi-Fi activity on a time scale of 100 milliseconds to determine
the length of LTE off time [9].
[16] Z. Lu, P. Sinha, and R. Srikant, “Easybid: Enabling cellular offloading
via small players,” in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, Toronto, Canada, April
2014, pp. 691–699.
[17] C. Cano, D. Lo´pez-Pe´rez, H. Claussen, and D. J. Leith, “Using LTE in
unlicensed bands: Potential benefits and co-existence issues,” Technical
Report, 2015. [Online]. Available: https://www.scss.tcd.ie/Doug.Leith/
pubs/ltewifi 2015.pdf.
[18] P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu, “Auctions with downstream interaction
among buyers,” Rand journal of economics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 768–
791, 2000.
[19] R. Zhang, M. Wang, L. X. Cai, Z. Zheng, X. Shen, and L. Xie, “LTE-
Unlicensed: The future of spectrum aggregation for cellular networks,”
IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 150–159, June 2015.
[20] A. M. Cavalcante, E. Almeida, R. D. Vieira, F. Chaves, R. C. Paiva,
F. Abinader, S. Choudhury, E. Tuomaala, and K. Doppler, “Performance
evaluation of LTE and Wi-Fi coexistence in unlicensed bands,” in Proc.
of IEEE VTC Spring, Dresden, Germany, June 2013.
[21] N. Rupasinghe and I. Guvenc, “Licensed-assisted access for WiFi-LTE
coexistence in the unlicensed spectrum,” in Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM
Workshops, Austin, TX, December 2014, pp. 894–899.
[22] Y. Li, F. Baccelli, J. G. Andrews, T. D. Novlan, and J. C. Zhang, “Mod-
eling and analyzing the coexistence of Wi-Fi and LTE in unlicensed
spectrum,” arXiv:1510.01392, 2015.
[23] J. Jeon, Q. C. Li, H. Niu, A. Papathanassiou, and G. Wu, “LTE in
the unlicensed spectrum: A novel coexistence analysis with WLAN
systems,” in Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM, Austin, TX, December 2014,
pp. 3459–3464.
[24] Q. Chen, G. Yu, H. Shan, A. Maaref, G. Y. Li, and A. Huang, “Cellular
meets WiFi: Traffic offloading or resource sharing?” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 3354–3367, January
2016.
[25] C. Cano, D. J. Leith, A. Garcia-Saavedra, and P. Serrano, “Fair coex-
istence of scheduled and random access wireless networks: Unlicensed
LTE/WiFi,” arXiv:1605.00409, 2016.
[26] C. Cano and D. J. Leith, “Coexistence of WiFi and LTE in unlicensed
bands: A proportional fair allocation scheme,” in Proc. of IEEE ICC
Workshops, London, UK, June 2015, pp. 2288–2293.
[27] R. Zhang, M. Wang, L. X. Cai, X. S. Shen, L.-L. Xie, and Y. Cheng,
“Modeling and analysis of MAC protocol for LTE-U co-existing with
Wi-Fi,” in Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM, San Diego, CA, December 2015.
[28] Z. Guan and T. Melodia, “CU-LTE: Spectrally-efficient and fair coex-
istence between LTE and Wi-Fi in unlicensed bands,” in Proc. of IEEE
INFOCOM, San Francisco, CA, April 2016.
[29] H. Zhang, Y. Xiao, L. X. Cai, D. Niyato, L. Song, and Z. Han, “A
hierarchical game approach for multi-operator spectrum sharing in LTE
unlicensed,” in Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM, San Diego, CA, December
2015.
[30] K. Bagwell, P. C. Mavroidis, and R. W. Staiger, “The case for auctioning
countermeasures in the WTO,” NBER Working Paper, no. w9920, 2003.
[31] G. Bianchi, “Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coor-
dination function,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 535–547, March 2000.
[32] F. Calı`, M. Conti, and E. Gregori, “Dynamic tuning of the IEEE
802.11 protocol to achieve a theoretical throughput limit,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 785–799, December 2000.
[33] H. Wu, Y. Peng, K. Long, S. Cheng, and J. Ma, “Performance of
reliable transport protocol over IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN: Analysis
and enhancement,” in Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, New York, NY, June
2002, pp. 599–607.
[34] X. Zhang, W. Wang, and Y. Yang, “Carrier aggregation for LTE-
advanced mobile communication systems,” IEEE Communications Mag-
azine, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 88–93, 2010.
[35] D. P. Bertsekas, Nonlinear Programming. Belmont, MA: Athena
Scientific, 1999.
16
Haoran Yu (S’14) received his Ph.D. degree at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2016. He was
a visiting student in the Yale Institute for Network
Science and the Department of Electrical Engineer-
ing at Yale University during 2015-2016. He is
now a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of
Information Engineering at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong. His research interests lie in the field
of wireless communications and network economics,
with current emphasis on cellular/Wi-Fi integration,
LTE in unlicensed spectrum, and economics of Wi-
Fi networks. He was awarded the Global Scholarship Programme for Research
Excellence by the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His paper in IEEE
INFOCOM 2016 was selected as a Best Paper Award finalist and one of top
5 papers from 1600+ submissions.
George Iosifidis received the Diploma degree
in electronics and telecommunications engineering
from the Greek Air Force Academy in 2000, and
the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering
from University of Thessaly, Greece, in 2007 and
2012, respectively. He worked as a post-doctoral
researcher at CERTH, Greece, and Yale University,
USA. He is currently the Ussher Assistant Professor
in Future Networks with Trinity College Dublin, and
also a Funded Investigator with the national research
centre CONNECT in Ireland. His research interests
lie in the broad area of wireless network optimization and network economics.
Jianwei Huang (S’01-M’06-SM’11-F’16) is
an Associate Professor and Director of the
Network Communications and Economics Lab
(ncel.ie.cuhk.edu.hk), in the Department of
Information Engineering at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong. He received the Ph.D. degree from
Northwestern University in 2005 and worked as
a Postdoc Research Associate in Princeton during
2005-2007. He is the co-recipient of 8 international
Best Paper Awards, including IEEE Marconi
Prize Paper Award in Wireless Communications
in 2011. He has co-authored six books, including the first textbook on
“Wireless Network Pricing.” He has served as an Associate Editor of
IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking, IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, and IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications - Cognitive Radio Series. He is the Vice Chair of
IEEE ComSoc Cognitive Network Technical Committee and the Past Chair
of IEEE ComSoc Multimedia Communications Technical Committee. He is a
Fellow of IEEE, a Distinguished Lecturer of IEEE Communications Society,
and a Thomson Reuters Highly Cited Researcher in Computer Science.
Leandros Tassiulas (S’89-M’91-SM’05-F’07) is the
John C. Malone Professor of Electrical Engineering
and member of the Institute for Network Science
at Yale University. His research interests are in
the field of computer and communication networks
with emphasis on fundamental mathematical models
and algorithms of complex networks, architectures
and protocols of wireless systems, sensor networks,
novel internet architectures and experimental plat-
forms for network research. His most notable con-
tributions include the max-weight scheduling algo-
rithm and the back-pressure network control policy, opportunistic scheduling
in wireless, the maximum lifetime approach for wireless network energy
management, and the consideration of joint access control and antenna
transmission management in multiple antenna wireless systems. Dr. Tassiulas
is a Fellow of IEEE (2007). His research has been recognized by several
awards including the IEEE Koji Kobayashi computer and communications
award (2016), the inaugural INFOCOM 2007 Achievement Award “for
fundamental contributions to resource allocation in communication networks”,
the INFOCOM 1994 best paper award, a National Science Foundation (NSF)
Research Initiation Award (1992), an NSF CAREER Award (1995), an
Office of Naval Research Young Investigator Award (1997) and a Bodossaki
Foundation award (1999). He holds a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the
University of Maryland, College Park (1991). He has held faculty positions
at Polytechnic University, New York, University of Maryland, College Park,
and University of Thessaly, Greece.
VIII. APPENDIX
For ease of exposition, we define b−kmin , minj∈K,j 6=k bj as
the minimum bid from the APOs excluding APO k.
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We define function H (r) as the left hand side of equation
(7):
H (r) , (1− F (r))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
r
)
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (r)− F (C))n (1− F (r))K−1−n C − r
n+ 1
.
(22)
Step 1: we show that function H (r) is continuous for r ∈
(−∞,∞). Since F (·) is the cumulative distribution function
of a continuous random variable, function F (r) is continuous
for r ∈ (−∞,∞). In particular, F (r) = 0 for r ∈ (−∞, rmin]
and F (r) = 1 for r ∈ [rmax,∞). Hence, function H (r) is
continuous for r ∈ (−∞,∞).
Step 2: we compute the values of function H (r) at points
r = C and r = rmax. First, we compute H (C) as follows:
H (C) = (1− F (C))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
C
)
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (C)− F (C))n(1− F (C))K−1−nC − C
n+ 1
= (1− F (C))K−1 1− η
APO
K
C. (23)
Since F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a random
variable, we have F (C) ≤ 1. Next we prove F (C) < 1 by
contradiction. Suppose F (C) = 1. Because C ∈ [rmin, rmax)
(the assumption of Section III-B), we can always find a ξ > 0
such that C + ξ ∈ [rmin, rmax]. The cumulative distribution
function is a non-decreasing function. Therefore, we have
F (C + ξ) ≥ F (C) = 1. Together with F (C + ξ) ≤ 1
(property of cumulative distribution function F (·)), we obtain
F (C + ξ) = 1 and F (C + ξ) − F (C) = 0. Recall that
F (·) and f (·) are the cumulative distribution function and
probability density function of a random variable, respectively.
We can write F (C + ξ)− F (C) as
F (C + ξ)− F (C) =
∫ C+ξ
C
f (r) dr. (24)
Therefore, the result F (C + ξ)−F (C) = 0 contradicts with
the fact that f (r) > 0 for all r ∈ [rmin, rmax] (Section II).
Hence, F (C) = 1 does not hold, and we obtain F (C) < 1.
Based on (23), F (C) < 1, and ηAPO ∈ (0, 1), we conclude
that H (C) > 0.
Then we compute H (rmax) as follows:
H (rmax)=(1− F (rmax))K−1
(
C− K − 1 + η
APO
K
rmax
)
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rmax)−F (C))n(1−F (rmax))K−1−nC−rmax
n+ 1
.
(25)
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Because F (rmax) = 1, we can further simplify H (rmax) as
H (rmax) = (1− F (C))K−1 C − rmax
K
.
Since F (C) < 1 and C ∈ [rmin, rmax), we conclude that
H (rmax) < 0.
Step 3: We have shown that function H (r) is continuous
for r ∈ (−∞,∞) and H (C) > 0 > H (rmax). Based on the
intermediate value theorem, there is at least one r ∈ (C, rmax)
satisfying H (r) = 0, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We consider the strategy for APO k ∈ K. Assuming that
all the other APOs adopt strategy b∗ (rk, C) defined in (8),
we show that choosing strategy b∗ (rk, C) in (8) maximizes
APO k’s payoff. We introduce the proofs in the following four
parts.
Part I: We assume that APO k’s type rk satisfies rk ∈
[rmin, C). We discuss the following two cases.
Case A: b−kmin ∈ [0, C]. In this case, the LTE can always
find an APO to cooperate with, and the analysis for APO k
is equivalent to that of a conventional second-price reverse
auction (without allocative externalities). Hence, bidding type
rk is APO k’s optimal strategy.
In particular, we study the optimal bidding strategy for
APO k with rk = rmin. When all the other APOs adopt
strategy b∗ (rk, C) in (8), we can show that b−kmin > rmin with
probability one. Therefore, if rk = rmin, bidding any value
from set [0, rmin) and bidding rmin generate the same payoff
to APO k. In other words, if rk = rmin, bidding any value
from [0, rmin] is APO k’s optimal strategy.
Case B: b−kmin = “N”. If APO k bids any value from set
[0, C] (for example, rk), it obtains the same payoff, which
equals the reserve rate C. If APO k bids “N”, its payoff will
be K−1+η
APO
K rk. Since C > rk >
K−1+ηAPO
K rk, bidding rk
is one of APO k’s optimal strategy. In particular, if rk = rmin,
bidding any value from set [0, rmin) is also optimal for APO
k (besides bidding rmin).
Combining Case A and Case B, we conclude that when
other APOs choose b∗ (rk, C) defined in (8), it is optimal for
APO k with rk ∈ [rmin, C) to also choose b∗ (rk, C) in (8).
Part II: We assume that APO k’s type rk satisfies rk ∈
[C, rT (C)). We compare bid C with bid “N” and any bid
smaller than C, respectively, and show that bid C is optimal
for APO k.
First, we compare bid C with bid “N”. We denote APO k’s
expected payoff under bid C as Πa. Since all the other K−1
APOs choose b∗ (rk, C) in (8), we compute Πa as (26). We
denote APO k’s expected payoff under bid “N” as Πb, and
compute it as (27). We compute the difference between Πa
and Πb as (28).
It is easy to find that Πa−Πb is strictly decreasing with rk.
Furthermore, based on the definition of rT (C), when rk =
rT (C), we have Πa − Πb = 0. Since we assume that APO
k’s type rk satisfies rk ∈ [C, rT (C)), we have Πa > Πb. In
other words, bidding C generates a higher payoff to APO k
than bidding “N”.
Second, we compare bid C with any bid x ∈ [0, C). It is
easy to find that bid C and bid x generate a difference on APO
k’s payoff only when b−kmin ∈ [x,C]. Since the other APOs bid
according to b∗ (rk, C) in (8), the probability for b−kmin = x ∈
[0, C) is zero. Therefore, we do not need to consider the case
where b−kmin = x. Next we discuss case b
−k
min ∈ (x,C) and case
b−kmin = C, separately:
• When b−kmin ∈ (x,C), bidding C generates a payoff of rk
to APO k, and bidding x generates a payoff of b−kmin to
APO k. Since b−kmin < C ≤ rk, in this case, bidding C
generates a higher payoff to APO k than bidding x;
• When b−kmin = C, APO k’s expected payoff under bid C
lies in interval (C, rk), and its payoff under bid x equals
C. Hence, in this case, bidding C generates a higher
greater than that under bid x.
To conclude, considering all cases, bidding C generates a
payoff higher than that under any bid smaller than C.
Therefore, when other APOs choose b∗ (rk, C) in (8), it
is optimal for APO k with rk ∈ [C, rT (C)) to also choose
b∗ (rk, C) in (8).
Part III: We assume that APO k’s type rk = rT (C). Based
on a similar analysis as Part II, we can show that bidding C
and bidding “N” generate the same expected payoff to APO
k. Furthermore, these two bids weakly dominate any bid in
[0, C).
Therefore, when other APOs choose b∗ (rk, C) in (8), it is
optimal for APO k with rk = rT (C) to also choose b∗ (rk, C)
in (8).
Part IV: We assume that APO k’s type rk ∈
(rT (C) , rmax]. Based on a similar analysis as Part II, we
can show that bid C weakly dominates any bid x < C.
Next, we only need to compare bid C and bid “N” for APO
k. Similar as Part II, we can compute Πa and Πb for APO k’s
expected payoffs under bid C and bid “N”, respectively. From
(28), we can show that Πa < Πb for rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax].
Therefore, bidding “N” generates a higher payoff to APO k
than bidding C.
To conclude, when other APOs choose b∗ (rk, C) in (8), it
is optimal for APO k with rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax] to also choose
b∗ (rk, C) in (8).
Summarizing Part I, Part II, Part III, and Part IV, we
complete the proof.
C. Preliminary Lemmas
In order to prove Theorem 2, we introduce some preliminary
lemmas in this section. For all these lemma, we assume that
C is fixed and chosen from ∈ [rmin, rmax).
Lemma 3. (Monotonicity) For a strategy function b˜ which
constitutes an SBNE, if rL, rH ∈ [rmin, rmax], rL < rH and
b˜ (rH , C) 6= “N”, we have b˜ (rL, C) 6= “N” and b˜ (rL, C) ≤
b˜ (rH , C).
Proof. We introduce the proof in the following two parts.
Part I: Now suppose there is an SBNE b˜, we first show that
if rL < rH and b˜ (rH , C) 6= “N”, we have b˜ (rL, C) 6= “N”.
We prove it by contradiction, i.e., suppose there exist rH , rL
such that b˜ (rH , C) 6= “N” and b˜ (rL, C) = “N”.
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Πa =
(
1− (1− F (C))K−1
)
rk + (1− F (rT (C)))K−1 C
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rT (C))− F (C))n (1− F (rT (C)))K−1−n C + nrk
n+ 1
. (26)
Πb =
(
1− (1− F (C))K−1
)
rk + (1− F (rT (C)))K−1 K − 1 + η
APO
K
rk
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rT (C))− F (C))n (1− F (rT (C)))K−1−n rk. (27)
Πa −Πb = (1− F (rT (C)))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
rk
)
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rT (C))− F (C))n (1− F (rT (C)))K−1−n C − rk
n+ 1
. (28)
We denote s , b˜ (rH , C) ∈ [0, C]. Next we assume APO
k’s type is rk = rH and study its strategy. Since b˜ constitutes
an SBNE and b˜ (rH , C) = s, if the other APOs choose strategy
b˜, bidding s is optimal to APO k.
Next we compute APO k’s expected payoff under bid s. We
define Pwin (s) as the probability that APO k wins the auction
with bid s, assuming the other K − 1 APOs adopt strategy b˜.
We also define Πwin (s) as APO k’s expected payoff when it
wins the auction with bid s, assuming the other K − 1 APOs
adopt strategy b˜. Based on Pwin (s) and Πwin (s), we compute
APO k’s expected payoff under bid s as Pwin (s)Πwin (s) +
(1− Pwin (s)) rH .
Then we compute APO k’s expected payoff under bid “N”.
We define D as the probability that b−kmin ∈ [0, C], assuming the
other K− 1 APOs adopt strategy b˜. APO k’s expected payoff
under bid “N” is computed as DrH +(1−D) K−1+η
APO
K rH .
Since b˜ (rH , C) = s, we have the following relation:
Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rH ≥
DrH + (1−D) K − 1 + η
APO
K
rH . (29)
By our assumption, we have b˜ (rL, C) = “N”. Next
we assume APO k’s type is rk = rL and study its
strategy. When APO k bids “N”, its expected payoff is
DrL + (1−D) K−1+η
APO
K rL; when APO k bids s (recall
that s = b˜ (rH , C)), its expected payoff is Pwin (s)Πwin (s) +
(1− Pwin (s)) rL.
Since b˜ (rL, C) = “N”, we have the following relation:
DrL + (1−D) K − 1 + η
APO
K
rL ≥
Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rL. (30)
Adding (29) and (30), we have(
1−Pwin (s)−D −(1−D) K −1 +η
APO
K
)
(rH −rL)≥0.
(31)
Recall that 1 −D is the probability that b−kmin = “N”, i.e.,
all the other K−1 APOs bid “N”. If APO k bids s and all the
other K − 1 APOs bid “N”, APO k definitely wins. Hence,
we have Pwin (s) ≥ 1−D. Based on this, we further have the
following inequality:(
1− Pwin (s)−D − (1−D) K − 1 + η
APO
K
)
(rH − rL)
≤ − (1−D) K − 1 + η
APO
K
(rH − rL) . (32)
We discuss the following two cases:
Case A: D < 1. In this case, the right hand side of (32) is
smaller than 0, which contradicts with (31).
Case B: D = 1. In this case, we can always find an APO
type rM ∈ (rL, rH) such that t , b˜ (rM , C) ∈ [0, C] and
Pwin (t) > 0, where Pwin (t) is defined as the probability of
winning the auction under bid t (assuming the other K − 1
APOs adopt strategy b˜). We can prove this by contradiction.
We assume that we cannot find such an APO type, then the
probability of any APO with type in (rL, rH) winning the
auction under its bid given by strategy b˜ is zero (assuming the
other K−1 APOs adopt strategy b˜). When we randomly pick
the K APOs according to the probability distribution f (·),
there is a chance that all the APOs have types in interval
(rL, rH). Based on our result, in this case, when all the
APOs adopt strategy b˜, there is no winner in the auction with
probability one. On the other hand, D = 1 implies that, when
all the APOs adopt strategy b˜, these K APOs bid from [0, C]
and there is a winner in the auction with probability one.
Hence, there is a contradiction and we can always find an
APO type rM as described above.
Similar as Πwin (s), we define Πwin (t) as the type-
rM APO’s payoff when it wins with bid t, assuming the
other APOs adopt strategy b˜. For the APO with type rM ,
b˜ (rM , C) = t. Therefore, we have:
Pwin (t)Πwin (t) + (1− Pwin (t)) rM
≥ DrM + (1−D) K − 1 + η
APO
K
rM = rM . (33)
After arrangement, we have
Pwin (t) rM ≤ Pwin (t)Πwin (t) . (34)
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Because Pwin (t) > 0, we obtain rM ≤ Πwin (t). Since rM ∈
(rL, rH), we further have
rL < Πwin (t) . (35)
Recall that we have assumed b˜ (rL, C) = “N”. Hence, we
have the following relation:
DrL + (1−D) K − 1 + η
APO
K
rL
≥ Pwin (t)Πwin (t) + (1− Pwin (t)) rL. (36)
After applying D = 1 and Pwin (t) > 0, we obtain
rL ≥ Πwin (t) . (37)
This contradicts with (35).
Therefore, there are contradictions for both Case A and Case
B. We conclude that, if rL < rH and b˜ (rH , C) 6= “N”, we
have b˜ (rL, C) 6= “N”, which completes the proof of Part I.
Part II: Now we show that, if rL < rH and b˜ (rH , C) 6=
“N”, we have b˜ (rL, C) ≤ b˜ (rH , C).
Similar as Part I, we define s , b˜ (rH , C), Pwin (s), and
Πwin (s). We also define o , b˜ (rL, C), Pwin (o), and Πwin (o).
We prove o ≤ s by contradiction, i.e., we assume that o > s.
For an APO with type rH , we have the following relation:
Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rH
≥ Pwin (o)Πwin (o) + (1− Pwin (o)) rH . (38)
For an APO with type rL, we have the following relation:
Pwin (o)Πwin (o) + (1− Pwin (o)) rL
≥ Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rL. (39)
Adding (38) and (39), we have:
(Pwin (o)− Pwin (s)) (rH − rL) ≥ 0. (40)
From rH > rL, we have Pwin (o) ≥ Pwin (s). Since s < o,
naturally we have Pwin (s) ≥ Pwin (o), i.e., given the fact
that the other APOs use strategy b˜, the probability that an
APO wins with bid s is not smaller than the probability that
it wins with a higher bid o. Hence, the only possibility is
that Pwin (o) = Pwin (s), which means the probability for a
particular APO to bid between interval [s, o] under strategy b˜
is zero.
We can find a type rG ∈ (rL, rH) such that Pwin (u) 6=
Pwin (s) , Pwin (o), where u , b˜ (rG, C) and Pwin (u) is the
probability that an APO of type rG wins the auction under
bid u, assuming the other APOs choose strategy b˜. We prove
this by contradiction. We suppose that for any APO type
rG ∈ (rL, rH), we have Pwin (u) = Pwin (s) = Pwin (o).
When we randomly pick an APO according to the probability
distribution f (·), there is a chance that the APO’s type is
from (rL, rH). Based on our assumption, when it bids based
on b˜, it should bid the same value with probability one. We
denote this bid value as v. Furthermore, we can always find
an APO type rF ∈ (rL, rH) such that b˜ (rF , C) = v. Based
on our assumption, we have Pwin (v) = Pwin (s) = Pwin (o).
However, this contradicts with the fact that there is a positive
chance that a randomly picked APO bids v and s 6= o. Hence,
we can always find an APO type rG as described above.
We discuss the following two cases.
Case A: u ∈ [0, o). We have the following relation for a
type rG APO:
Pwin (u)Πwin (u) + (1− Pwin (u)) rG
≥ Pwin (o)Πwin (o) + (1− Pwin (o)) rG. (41)
After rearrangement, we have
Pwin (u)Πwin (u)−Pwin (o)Πwin (o) ≥ (Pwin (u)−Pwin (o)) rG.
(42)
Since u < o and Pwin (u) 6= Pwin (o), we have Pwin (u) >
Pwin (o). From (42) and rG > rL, we have
Pwin (u)Πwin (u)− Pwin (o)Πwin (o)
> (Pwin (u)− Pwin (o)) rL. (43)
After rearrangement, we have
Pwin (u)Πwin (u) + (1− Pwin (u)) rL
> Pwin (o)Πwin (o) + (1− Pwin (o)) rL. (44)
This means an APO of type rL prefers the bid u over o, which
contradicts with the fact that o = b˜ (rL, C). Therefore, u can
not be in interval [0, s).
Case B: u ∈ [o, C]. We have the following relation for a
type rG APO:
Pwin (u)Πwin (u) + (1− Pwin (u)) rG
≥ Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rG. (45)
After rearrangement, we have
(Pwin (s)− Pwin (u)) rG ≥ Pwin (s)Πwin (s)− Pwin (u)Πwin (u) .
(46)
Since u > s and Pwin (u) 6= Pwin (s), we have Pwin (u) <
Pwin (s). From (46) and rG < rH , we have
(Pwin (s)− Pwin (u)) rH
> Pwin (s)Πwin (s)− Pwin (u)Πwin (u) . (47)
After rearrangement, we have
Pwin (u)Πwin (u) + (1− Pwin (u)) rH
> Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rH . (48)
This means an APO of type rH prefers the bid u over s, which
contradicts with the fact that s = b˜ (rH , C). Therefore, u can
not be in interval [o, C].
Based on Case A and Case B, we prove that o ≤ s. In other
words, if rL < rH and b˜ (rH , C) 6= “N”, we have b˜ (rL, C) ≤
b˜ (rH , C). This completes the proof of Part II.
Combining Part I and Part II, we complete the proof of
the lemma.
Lemma 4. For a strategy function b˜ which constitutes an
SBNE, we use Q to denote the probability that an APO bids
a value from set [0, C] (i.e., not bid “N ”) under strategy b˜.
We have Q < 1.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction: we assume that Q = 1.
Then we can always find APO k with type rZ ∈ (C, rmax] that
bids a value from [0, C]. We denote s , b˜ (rZ , C). Therefore,
we have the following relation for APO k’s payoffs under bid
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s and “N”:
Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rZ ≥ rZ , (49)
where the definitions of Pwin (s) and Πwin (s) can be found
in the proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 3 and b˜ (rZ , C) = s,
all APOs with types in (rZ , rmax] will bid “N” or values no
smaller than s. This means Pwin (s) > 0. Furthermore, based
on the payment rule, we have Πwin (s) ≤ C < rZ . Hence, we
have
Pwin (s)Πwin (s) + (1− Pwin (s)) rZ < rZ , (50)
which contradicts with (49). Therefore, Q can only be smaller
than 1, which completes the proof.
Lemma 5. For a strategy function b˜ which constitutes an
SBNE, there exists rA ∈ (rmin, rmax) such that b˜ (r, C) =
“N” for all r ∈ (rA, rmax] and b˜ (r, C) ∈ [0, C] for all
r ∈ [rmin, rA).
Proof. According to Lemma 4, there is a positive measure of
types that bid “N” under b˜. Based on Lemma 3, the set of these
APO types should have the form of (rA, rmax] or [rA, rmax],
where rA ∈ [rmin, rmax).
Suppose rA = rmin, i.e., b˜ (r, C) = “N” for all r ∈
[rmin, rmax]. Since C ≥ rmin > K−1+η
APO
K rmin, we can find
an APO type rˆ ∈ (rmin, rmax) such that C > K−1+η
APO
K rˆ.
Then such an APO can bid a value from [0, C] and win a
payoff of C. Since C > K−1+η
APO
K rˆ, the obtained payoff is
greater than the APO’s payoff K−1+η
APO
K rˆ when it bids “N”.
In other words, the APO with type rˆ will deviate from “N”.
This means rA can not be equal to rmin.
Therefore, we have shown that, there exists rA ∈
(rmin, rmax) such that b˜ (r, C) = “N” for all r ∈ (rA, rmax]
and b˜ (r, C) ∈ [0, C] for all r ∈ [rmin, rA).
Lemma 6. For a strategy function b˜ which constitutes an
SBNE, there exists rB ∈ [rmin, rA) such that b˜ (r, C) = C for
all r ∈ (rB , rA) and b˜ (r, C) ∈ [0, C) for all r ∈ [rmin, rB).
Proof. We explain the proof by the following two parts.
Part I: We first prove that, if there exist rL, rH ∈
[rmin, rmax] and rL 6= rH such that b˜ (r, C) = X for all
r ∈ (rL, rH), then X = C. We show this by contradiction,
i.e., we assume that X < C. We discuss the following two
cases.
Case A: X < rH . We can find r¯H ∈ (rL, rH) such that
X < r¯H . Furthermore, we can find  > 0 such that X+ < r¯H
and X +  < C. Next we show that APO k with type r¯H has
the incentive to deviate from bid X to bid X+. Note that bid
X and bid X +  generate a difference to APO k only when
b−kmin ∈ [X,X + ]. In particular, we discuss the following two
situations:
• When b−kmin = X , bidding X generates an expected payoff
with a value in (X, r¯H), and bidding X +  generates a
payoff of r¯H . Because X < r¯H , in this case, bidding
X +  is strictly better;
• When b−kmin ∈ (X,X + ], bidding X generates a payoff
that is not greater than X+, and bidding X+ generates
an expected payoff that is greater than X + . Hence, in
this case, bidding X +  is strictly better.
Notice that, since b˜ (r, C) = X for all r ∈ (rL, rH), b−kmin = X
happens with a non-zero probability. Therefore, it is strictly
better for the type-r¯H APO to deviate to bid X + . This
violates the assumption that b˜ (r, C) = X for all r ∈ (rL, rH).
Case B: X ≥ rH . We can find rˆH ∈ (rL, rH) such that X >
rˆH . Furthermore, we can find ξ > 0 such that X − ξ > rˆH .
Next we show that APO k with type rˆH has the incentive to
deviate from bid X to bid X−ξ. Note that bid X and bid X−ξ
generate a difference to APO k only when b−kmin ∈ [X − ξ,X].
In particular, we discuss the following two situations:
• When b−kmin ∈ [X − ξ,X), bidding X generates a payoff
of rˆH , and bidding X − ξ generates an expected payoff
that is greater than rˆH . Hence, in this case, bidding X−ξ
is strictly better;
• When b−kmin = X , bidding X generates an expected payoff
with a value in (rˆH , X), while bidding X − ξ generates
a payoff of X . Because X > rˆH , in this case, bidding
X − ξ is strictly better.
Notice that, since b˜ (r, C) = X for all r ∈ (rL, rH), b−kmin = X
happens with a non-zero probability. Therefore, it is strictly
better for the type-rˆH APO to deviate to bid X − ξ. This
violates the assumption that b˜ (r, C) = X for all r ∈ (rL, rH).
Combining Case A and Case B, we complete the proof of
Part I.
Part II: We then prove that, there exists ω ∈ (0, rA − rmin]
such that b˜ (r, C) = C for all r ∈ [rA − ω, rA). We show it
by contradiction, i.e., we assume that for all r < rA, we have
b˜ (r, C) < C (note that from Lemma 5, for all r < rA, we
have b˜ (r, C) ≤ C).
We discuss the following two cases.
Case A: rA ≤ C. Naturally, we have K−1+η
APO
K rA <
C and we can find an APO type rU ∈ (rA, rmax) such
that K−1+η
APO
K rU < C. According to Lemma 5, we have
b˜ (rU , C) = “N”. Next we show that APO k with type rU has
an incentive to switch its bid from “N” to C.
Note that bid C and bid “N” generate a difference payoff
to APO k only when b−kmin = C or “N”. We do not need to
consider the case where b−kmin = C, because all APO types in
[rmin, rA)∪(rA, rmax] do not bid C based on our assumption,
and the probability for an APO to be of type rA is zero.
Therefore, we only need to consider b−kmin = “N”. In this
case, the payoffs of APO k under bid “N” and bid C are
K−1+ηAPO
K rU and C, respectively. Since C >
K−1+ηAPO
K rU ,
in this case, bid C is strictly better than bid “N”. Based on
Lemma 5, there is a non-zero probability that b−kmin = “N”.
Therefore, we can conclude that APO k with type rU has
an incentive to switch its bid from “N” to C, which violates
b˜ (rU , C) = “N”.
Case B: rA > C. We can find an APO type rS ∈ (C, rA).
According to the assumption, we have w , b˜ (rS , C) < C.
Next we show that APO k with type rS has the incentive to
switch from bidding w to bidding C.
Note that bid w and bid C generate a difference payoff to
APO k only when b−kmin ∈ [w,C]. Furthermore, based on the
conclusion in Part I and Lemma 3, the probability that b−kmin =
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w is zero. Based on the assumption in Part II, the probability
that b−kmin = C is zero. Therefore, we do not need to consider
the case where b−kmin = w or C, and only need to compare bid
w and bid C under the situation where b−kmin ∈ (w,C). When
b−kmin ∈ (w,C), bid w generates a payoff that is smaller than
C, and bid C generates a payoff of rS . Since rS > C, bid C
is strictly better than bid w for APO k with type rS , which
violates b˜ (rS , C) = w.
Based on Case A and Case B, the assumption that b˜ (r, C) <
C for all r < rA does not hold. Therefore, we can find an
APO type r′ ∈ [rmax, rA) such that b˜ (r′, C) = C. Based on
Lemma 3, we have b˜ (r, C) = C for all r ∈ [r′, rA), where
we complete the proof of Part II.
Based on Part I, Part II, and Lemma 3, it is easy to show
that there exists rB ∈ [rmin, rA) such that b˜ (r, C) = C for all
r ∈ (rB , rA) and b˜ (r, C) ∈ [0, C) for all r ∈ [rmin, rB).
Lemma 7. For a strategy function b˜ which constitutes an
SBNE, (1) b˜ (rB , C) = C; (2) b˜ (r, C) = r for all r ∈
(rmin, rB).
Proof. We show the proof by the following two parts.
Part I: We first prove b˜ (rB , C) = C by contradiction,
i.e., we assume that b˜ (rB , C) = X < C. Based on Lemma
3, Lemma 5, and Lemma 6, we have b˜ (r, C) < X for r ∈
[rmin, rB), b˜ (r, C) = C for r ∈ (rB , rA), and b˜ (r, C) = “N”
for r ∈ (rA, rmax].
We discuss the following three cases.
Case A: rB > C. We compare bid X and bid C for APO k
with type rB . When b−kmin < X or b
−k
min = “N”, bid X and bid
C generate the same payoff to APO k. Furthermore, b−kmin ∈
[X,C) with probability zero. We only need to consider the
situation where b−kmin = C. In this situation, bid X generates
C and bid C generates an expected payoff that strictly lies
between rB and C. Since rB > C, bid C generates a higher
payoff than bid C, which violates b˜ (rB , C) = X .
Case B: rB = C. We can find a type r¯B ∈ [rmin, rB) such
that r¯B > X . According to b˜ (rB , C) = X and Lemma 3, we
have s , b˜ (r¯B , C) < X . Next we compare bid X and bid s
for APO k with type r¯B . Similar as the explanation before,
we only need to consider the situation where b−kmin ∈ (s,X).
In this situation, bid X generates r¯B , and bid s generates a
payoff that is smaller than X . Since r¯B > X , we find bid X
is strictly better than bid s for APO k with type r¯B , which
violates b˜ (r¯B , C) = s.
Case C: rB < C. We can find a type rˆB ∈ (rB , rA) such
that C > rˆB . According to Lemma 6, b˜ (rˆB , C) = C. Next we
compare bid X and bid C for APO k with type rˆB . Similar as
the explanation before, we only need to consider the situation
where b−kmin = C. In this situation, bid X generates C and bid
C generates an expected payoff smaller than C. Therefore, bid
X is strictly better than bid C for APO k with type rˆB , which
violates b˜ (rˆB , C) = C.
Based on Case A, Case B, and Case C, we conclude that
b˜ (rB , C) = C, which completes the proof of Part I.
Part II: We next show that b˜ (r, C) = r for all r ∈
(rmin, rB). We consider an APO with type rM ∈ (rmin, rB)
and denote x , b˜ (rM , C). From Lemma 3, function b˜ (r, C)
is increasing for r ∈ (rmin, rB). Hence, the left-hand limit of
b˜ (r, C) at r = rM exists, and we denote u , lim
r↑rM
b˜ (r, C)
(recall that C is assumed to be fixed). Next we prove u = rM
by contradiction. We assume that u > rM or u < rM , and
consider the following two cases.
Case A: u > rM . Since the left-hand limit of b˜ (r, C) at
r = rM exists and equals u, we can find a ζ > 0 such
that b˜ (r, C) ∈ (rM , u) for all r ∈ (rM − ζ, rM ). We then
pick an APO type rL from interval (rM − ζ, rM ) and denote
u¯ , b˜ (rL, C). Naturally, we have u¯ > rM . Based on the
monotonicity of b˜ (r, C) in Lemma 3 and Lemma 6, we also
have x > u¯. Furthermore, APOs with type in (rL, rM ) have
b˜ (r, C) ∈ (u¯, u). Next we compare bid x and bid u¯ for
APO k with type rM . Notice that these two bids generate
a difference to APO k only when b−kmin ∈ [u¯, x]. Furthermore,
the probability for b−kmin = u¯ or x is zero. Hence, we only need
to consider the situation where b−kmin ∈ (u¯, x). In this situation,
bid x causes a payoff of rM , and bid u¯ causes a payoff that
is larger than u¯. Since we have u¯ > rM , we conclude that bid
u¯ is strictly better than bid x, which violates b˜ (rM , C) = x.
Case B: u < rM . We can find an APO type rS ∈ (u, rM )
and denote v , b˜ (rS , C). Since u is the left-hand limit of
b˜ (r, C) at r = rM , we have b˜ (r, C) ∈ (v, u) for all r ∈
(rS , rM ). Next we compare bid v and bid u for APO k with
type rS . Notice that these two bids generate a difference to
APO k only when b−kmin ∈ [v, u]. Furthermore, the probability
for b−kmin = v or u is zero. Hence, we only need to consider the
situation where b−kmin ∈ (v, u). In this situation, bid v causes
a payoff that is smaller than u, and bid u causes a payoff of
rS . Since we have rS > u, we conclude that bid u is strictly
better than bid v, which violates b˜ (rS , C) = v.
We conclude that u = rM , i.e., the left-hand limit of
function b˜ (r, C) at r = rM equals rM . With the similar
approach, we can show that the right-hand limit of function
b˜ (r, C) at r = rM also equals rM . Together with the
monotonicity property in Lemma 3, we can easily obtain that
b˜ (r, C) is continuous at point r = rM and b˜ (rM , C) = rM .
Because rM can be any point from interval (rmin, rB), we
conclude that b˜ (r, C) = r for all r ∈ (rmin, rB), which
completes the proof of Part II.
Combining Part I and Part II, we prove the lemma.
Lemma 8. For a strategy function b˜ which constitutes an
SBNE, rB = C and rA = rT (C), where rT (C) is defined in
Lemma 1.
Proof. We explain the proof in the following two parts.
Part I: We first prove rB = C. According to Lemma 7, we
can easily show that rB ≤ C. Next we assume rB = X < C.
Based on Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, we have b˜ (r, C) = C for
all r ∈ (rB , rA), and b˜ (r, C) ∈ [0, X) for all r ∈ (rmin, rB).
Since rB < C, we can find an APO type rM such that rM ∈
(rB , C). Naturally, we have b˜ (rM , C) = C. Next we compare
bid C and bid X for APO k with type rM . Note that bid C
and bid X generate a difference to APO k only when b−kmin ∈
[X,C]. Furthermore, the probability that b−kmin ∈ [X,C) is
zero. Hence, we only need to consider the situation where
b−kmin = C. In this situation, bid C generates an expected payoff
in (rM , C) and bid X generates C. Since we have C > rM ,
22
we conclude that bid X is strictly better than bid C, which
violates b˜ (rM , C) = C. Therefore, the only possible relation
between rB and C is that rB = C. We complete the proof of
Part I.
Part II: We then prove rA = rT (C), where rT (C) is
defined in Lemma 1. We first denote the payoff of an arbitrary
APO type r ∈ (rmin, rmax) under bid C and bid “N” as Π1
and Π2, respectively. We compute Π1 as (51), and compute
Π2 as (52). Furthermore, we denote their difference as W (r),
and compute it as (53).
According to Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, b˜ (r, C) = C for
all r ∈ [rB , rA) and b˜ (r, C) = “N” for all r ∈ (rA, rmax].
Hence, W (r) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ [rB , rA) and W (r) ≤ 0 for
all r ∈ (rA, rmax]. It is easy to find that W (r) is strictly
decreasing and continuous for r ∈ [rB , rmax]. Hence, we have
W (rA) = 0, which means rA needs to satisfy the following
equation:
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rA)−F (C))n (1−F (rA))K−1−n C−rA
n+ 1
+ (1− F (rA))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
rA
)
= 0. (54)
Furthermore, from Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and rB = C, we have
rA ∈ (C, rmax).
In Lemma 1, we define rT (C) ∈ (C, rmax) as the solution
to
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (r)− F (C))n (1− F (r))K−1−n C − r
n+ 1
+ (1− F (r))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
r
)
= 0. (55)
Hence, rA = rT (C), and we complete the proof of Part II.
Combining Part I and Part II, we complete the proof of
the lemma.
Lemma 9. For a strategy function b˜ which constitutes an
SBNE, it needs to satisfy the following conditions:
(1) b˜ (rmin, C) ∈ [0, rmin];
(2) b˜ (r, C) = r for all r ∈ (rmin, C);
(3) b˜ (r, C) = C for all r ∈ [C, rT (C));
(4) b˜ (rT (C) , C) = C or “N”;
(5) b˜ (r, C) = “N” for all r ∈ (rT (C) , rmax].
Proof. Items (2), (3), and (5) can be directly obtained from
Lemma 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 7, and Lemma 8. For item (1),
since b˜ (r, C) = r for all r ∈ (rmin, C), it is natural that the
bidder of type rmin should not bid a value that is larger than
rmin (based on the monotonicity in Lemma 3). For item (4),
since b˜ (r, C) = C for all r ∈ [C, rT (C)) and b˜ (r, C) = “N”
for all r ∈ (rT (C) , rmax], it is easy to show that the bidder
of type rT (C) can only bid C or “N” (from the monotonicity
in Lemma 3).
D. Proof of Theorem 2
From Lemma 9, the bidding strategy in (8) is the unique
strategy that satisfies all conditions for an equilibrium strategy.
Furthermore, from Theorem 1, the bidding strategy in (8)
constitutes an SBNE. Therefore, it is the unique form of the
bidding strategy under an SBNE.
E. Proofs of Theorem 3, Theorem 4, and Theorem 5
Notice that in Section III-B, we consider the situation where
C is from [rmin, rmax), and show the three-region structure
of the bidding strategies: some APO types bid their types,
some APO types bid the reserve rate, and some APO types
bid “N”. In Sections III-C, III-D and III-E, we consider the
situation where C is from C ∈ [0, rmin) ∪ [rmax,∞). Since
in this situation, the reserve rate is either very small or very
large, among the three regions of APOs’ strategies introduced
in Section III-B, only one or two will appear in this case.
Hence, the equilibrium analysis in Sections III-C, III-D and
III-E can be treated as the special cases of the analysis in
Section III-B.
Therefore, the proofs of Theorem 3, Theorem 4, and Theo-
rem 5 are similar to those of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. The
details are omitted.
F. Proof of Lemma 2
Let H (r) be the left hand side of equation (10). It is easy
to find that H (r) is continuous in [rmin, rmax]. Furthermore,
we have
H (rmin) = C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
rmin > 0, (56)
H (rmax) =
C − rmax
K
< 0. (57)
Hence, there is at least one solution in (rmin, rmax) satisfying
H (r) = 0.
G. Preliminary Lemma
In order to prove Theorem 6, we introduce a preliminary
lemma in this section.
Lemma 10. (a) When RLTE > K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, C =
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin is a local minimum of Π¯
LTE (C); (b) when
RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, C =
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin is a global
maximum of Π¯LTE (C).
Proof. We prove the lemma by the following two parts.
Part I: We show that when RLTE > K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin,
C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin is a local minimum of Π¯
LTE (C). First,
it is easy to show that Π¯LTE (C) is continuous at point
C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin. According to (15), we can compute
(58). We take the derivates of both sides of equation (10) over
r, and obtain (59).
Therefore, we have lim
C↓K−1+ηAPOK rmin
drX(C)
dC > 0. Based
on this, condition RLTE > K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, and (58), we
conclude that lim
C↓K−1+ηAPOK rmin
dΠ¯LTE(C)
dC > 0. Furthermore,
dΠ¯LTE(C)
dC is continuous for C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
.
Hence, there exists an  > 0 such that dΠ¯
LTE(C)
dC >
0 for all C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin,
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin + 
)
. On
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Π1 ,
(
1− (1− F (C))K−1
)
r + (1− F (rA))K−1 C
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rA)− F (C))n (1− F (rA))K−1−n C + nr
n+ 1
. (51)
Π2 ,
(
1− (1− F (C))K−1
)
r + (1− F (rA))K−1 K − 1 + η
APO
K
r
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rA)− F (C))n (1− F (rA))K−1−n r, (52)
W (r) , Π1 −Π2
= (1− F (rA))K−1
(
C − K − 1 + η
APO
K
r
)
+
K−1∑
n=1
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rA)− F (C))n (1− F (rA))K−1−n C − r
n+ 1
. (53)
lim
C↓K−1+ηAPOK rmin
dΠ¯LTE (C)
dC
= lim
C↓K−1+ηAPOK rmin
Kf (rmin)
drX (C)
dC
((
1− δLTE)RLTE − K − 1 + ηAPO
K
rmin
)
. (58)
(
K − 1 + ηAPO
K
+
(K − 1)
2
f (rmin)
1− ηAPO
K
rmin
)
lim
C↓K−1+ηAPOK rmin
drX (C)
dC
= 1. (59)
the other hand, since Π¯LTE (C) is a constant for C ∈[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
based on (14), we have dΠ¯
LTE(C)
dC = 0
for C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
)
. Therefore, we conclude that
C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin is the local minimum of function
Π¯LTE (C). This completes the proof of Part I.
Part II: we show that when RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, C =
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin is a global maximum of Π¯
LTE (C). Notice that
when C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
, Π¯LTE (C) = δLTERLTE. We
compare this value with the LTE’s payoff under other intervals
of C as follows:
Case A: C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
. In
this case, the LTE provider’s payoff contains
two parts: (1− F (rX (C)))2 δLTERLTE and(
1− (1− F (rX (C)))2
)
(RLTE − C), and both of the coeffi-
cients (i.e., (1− F (rX (C)))2 and
(
1− (1− F (rX (C)))2
)
)
are positive. Because RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin, we
have RLTE − K−1+η
APO
K rmin ≤ δLTERLTE. Moreover,
we have C > K−1+η
APO
K rmin. Hence, we can obtain
RLTE − C < δLTERLTE, which means the LTE’s payoff
under C ∈
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmin
)
is always smaller than
that under C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin;
Case B: C ∈ [rmin, rmax). In this case, if there is a
competition, LTE obtains δLTERLTE, otherwise, it obtains the
difference between RLTE and the payment to APOs. In the
latter case, the LTE’s payoff is no larger than RLTE − rmin.
Since rmin > K−1+η
APO
K rmin ≥ (1− δ)RLTE, the LTE’s
payoff in the latter case is smaller than δLTERLTE, which
is the payoff under C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin. In other words, the
LTE’s payoff under C ∈ [rmin, rmax) is always smaller than
that under C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin;
Case C: C ∈ [rmax,∞). In this case, based on a similar
analysis as Case B and Case C, we can show that the LTE’s
payoff is also smaller than that under C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin.
Based on Case A, Case B, and Case C, we prove Part II.
Combing Part I and Part II, we complete the proof of the
lemma.
H. Proof of Theorem 6
We discuss the optimal reserve rate in the following three
cases:
Case A: RLTE ≤ K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin. Based on Lemma 10, in
this case, the LTE provider achieves the highest payoff (i.e.,
δLTERLTE) with C ∈
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
. Because the LTE
provider works in the competition mode and does not need to
allocate rate to APOs, constraint bmax (C) ≤ RLTE in Problem
(19) is automatically satisfied. Hence, the optimal C∗ can be
any value from
[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
;
Case B: K−1+η
APO
K(1−δLTE) rmin < RLTE ≤ rmax. Based on
Lemma 10, in this case, point C = K−1+η
APO
K rmin is a local
minimum, and the LTE provider will not consider any C ∈[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
as the optimal reserve rate. Therefore, the
optimal C∗ should be chosen from set
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin,∞
)
.
Moreover, if C∗ is larger than RLTE, it is possible that an APO
bids a value larger than RLTE, which implies the violation
of constraint bmax (C) ≤ RLTE. Hence, C∗ should be set
no larger than RLTE. To conclude, C∗ can be chosen from(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, RLTE
]
;
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Case C: RLTE > max
{
rmax,
K−1+ηAPO
K(1−δLTE) rmin
}
. Similar
as Case B, the LTE provider will not consider any C ∈[
0, K−1+η
APO
K rmin
]
as the optimal reserve rate. Further-
more, the LTE’s payoff is a constant for C ∈ [rmax,∞).
Hence, it is sufficient for the LTE to consider C∗ from set(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmax
]
. In this situation, because RLTE >
max
{
rmax,
K−1+ηAPO
K(1−δLTE) rmin
}
, the condition C∗ ≤ RLTE is
automatically satisfied. Therefore, we conclude that C∗ can
be chosen from
(
K−1+ηAPO
K rmin, rmax
]
.
Based on Case A, Case B, and Case C, we complete the
proof of Theorem 6.
I. Assumption 1 Under Uniform Distribution (K = 2)
In this section, we prove that when K = 2, Assumption 1
holds under the uniform distribution.
Part A: we prove that equation (7) has a unique solution in
(C, rmax). For the uniform distribution, the cumulative distri-
bution function is F (r) = r−rminrmax−rmin , where r ∈ [rmin, rmax].
By using the expression of F (r) and the fact that K = 2, we
can rewrite (7) as
r − C
rmax − rmin
C − r
2
+
rmax − r
rmax − rmin
(
C − 1 + η
APO
2
r
)
= 0.
(60)
After rearrangement, we have
ηAPO
2
r2 − 1 + η
APO
2
rmaxr + rmaxC − C
2
2
= 0. (61)
We define function H (r) as the left hand side of (61):
H (r) , η
APO
2
r2 − 1 + η
APO
2
rmaxr + rmaxC − C
2
2
. (62)
Since H (r) is a quadratic function, we can show that its
value decreases with r for r ∈
[
rmin,
1+ηAPO
2ηAPO rmax
)
. Because
C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and 1+η
APO
2ηAPO > 1, we have rmin ≤ C <
rmax <
1+ηAPO
2ηAPO rmax. Therefore, H (r) decreases with r for
r ∈ [C, rmax].
When r = C and r = rmax, the values of function H (r)
are as follows:
H (C) =
1− ηAPO
2
(rmax − C)C > 0, (63)
H (rmax) = −1
2
(rmax − C)2 < 0. (64)
Considering the fact that H (r) is decreasing for r ∈ [C, rmax],
we can conclude that there is a unique r ∈ (C, rmax) that
satisfies equation H (r) = 0. In other words, when F (r)
follows the uniform distribution and K = 2, equation (7) has
a unique solution in (C, rmax).
Part B: we prove that equation equation (10) has a unique
solution in (rmin, rmax). By using F (r) = r−rminrmax−rmin and the
fact that K = 2, we can rewrite (10) as
r − rmin
rmax − rmin
C − r
2
+
rmax − r
rmax − rmin
(
C − 1 + η
APO
2
r
)
= 0.
(65)
After rearrangement, we have
ηAPO
2
r2 − C
2
r +
rmin
2
r − 1 + η
APO
2
rmaxr
+ rmaxC − Crmin
2
= 0. (66)
We define function J (r) as the left hand side of (66):
J (r) ,η
APO
2
r2 − C
2
r +
rmin
2
r
− 1 + η
APO
2
rmaxr + rmaxC − Crmin
2
. (67)
We can show that
J (rmin) = (rmax − rmin)
(
C − 1 + η
APO
2
rmin
)
> 0, (68)
J (rmax) =
1
2
(rmax − rmin) (C − rmax) < 0. (69)
Next we discuss two situations: rmax ≤
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO and rmax >
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO .
When rmax ≤ (1+η
APO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO , the quadratic function
J (r) is decreasing for r ∈ [rmin, rmax]. Based on (68) and
(69), we can conclude that there is a unique r ∈ (rmin, rmax)
that satisfies equation J (r) = 0.
When rmax >
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO , we can
show that the quadratic function J (r) is decreasing
for r ∈
[
rmin,
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO
)
and
increasing for r ∈
(
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO , rmax
]
. If
J
(
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO
)
≥ 0, we have J (r) ≥ 0
for all r ∈ [rmin, rmax], which contradicts with (69).
Therefore, we have J
(
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO
)
< 0.
Together with (68) and the fact that J (r) is decreasing
for r ∈
[
rmin,
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO
)
, we can show
that there is a unique r ∈
(
rmin,
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO
)
that satisfies equation J (r) = 0. Moreover, since J (r)
is increasing for r ∈
(
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO , rmax
]
,
J
(
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO
)
< 0, and J (rmax) < 0,
function J (r) is always smaller than zero for
r ∈
[
(1+ηAPO)rmax+C−rmin
2ηAPO , rmax
)
. That is to say, there is a
unique r ∈ (rmin, rmax) that satisfies equation J (r) = 0.
From the results of the two situations, we can conclude
that when F (r) follows the uniform distribution and K = 2,
equation (10) has a unique solution in (rmin, rmax).
Combining Part A and Part B, we complete the proof.
J. Assumption 1 Under Uniform Distribution and Truncated
Normal Distribution (General K)
In this section, we show that Assumption 1 holds under the
uniform distribution and truncated normal distribution for a
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Fig. 14: Uniqueness of rT (C) Under Uniform Distribution.
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Fig. 15: Uniqueness of rT (C) Under Truncated Normal Distribution.
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Fig. 16: Uniqueness of rX (C) Under Uniform Distribution.
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Fig. 17: Uniqueness of rX (C) Under Truncated Normal Distribution.
general K through simulation. We show the following four
cases:
Case A: Uniqueness of rT (C) under the uniform distribu-
tion. We choose K = 5, ηAPO = 0.3, C = 70 Mbps, and
rk ∼ U [50 Mbps, 200 Mbps] for all k ∈ K. We denote the
left-hand-side of equation (7) as H1 (r), and plot it against
r in Fig. 14. We can find that there is a unique solution for
H1 (r) = 0. In other words, there is a unique rT (C) in this
case;
Case B: Uniqueness of rT (C) under the truncated normal
distribution. We choose K = 5, ηAPO = 0.3, and C =
70 Mbps. We obtain the distribution of rk, k ∈ K, by trun-
cating the normal distribution N (125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps2) to
interval [50 Mbps, 200 Mbps]. We denote the left-hand-side
of equation (7) as H2 (r), and plot it against r in Fig. 15. We
can find that there is a unique solution for H2 (r) = 0. In
other words, there is a unique rT (C) in this case;
Case C: Uniqueness of rX (C) under the uniform distribu-
tion. We choose K = 5, ηAPO = 0.3, C = 46 Mbps, and
rk ∼ U [50 Mbps, 200 Mbps] for all k ∈ K. We denote the
left-hand-side of equation (10) as H3 (r), and plot it against
r in Fig. 16. We can find that there is a unique solution for
H3 (r) = 0. In other words, there is a unique rX (C) in this
case;
Case D: Uniqueness of rT (C) under the truncated normal
distribution. We choose K = 5, ηAPO = 0.3, and C =
46 Mbps. We obtain the distribution of rk, k ∈ K, by trun-
cating the normal distribution N (125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps2) to
interval [50 Mbps, 200 Mbps]. We denote the left-hand-side
of equation (10) as H4 (r), and plot it against r in Fig. 17.
We can find that there is a unique solution for H4 (r) = 0. In
other words, there is a unique rX (C) in this case.
K. Computation of r¯pay (C)
We first compute the probability distribution of b−kmin. We
denote the CDF of b−kmin as G (·) and compute it as
G (r) = 1− (1− F (r))K−1 , r ∈ [rmin, rmax] . (70)
Hence, we denote the PDF of b−kmin as g (·) and compute it as
g (r) =
dG (r)
dr
= (K − 1) f (r) (1− F (r))K−2 , r ∈ [rmin, rmax] .
(71)
We focus on the expected payment received by APO k.
APO k wins the auction under the following three cases:
• rk ∈ [rmin, C) and b−kmin ∈ [rk, C). In this case, APO k
receives b−kmin from the LTE;
• rk ∈ [rmin, C) and b−kmin = C or “N”. In this case, APO
k receives C from the LTE;
• rk ∈ [C, rT (C)] and b−kmin = C or “N”. In this case, the
expected payment that APO k receives depends on the
number of APOs bidding C.
Based on this discussion, we can compute the expected pay-
ment that APO k receives as (72). Furthermore, it is easy to
find that relation (73) holds. Based on G (r) in (70), g (r)
in (71), and (73), we rewrite (72) as (74). Notice that (74)
shows the expected payment that APO k receives from the
LTE. Since we consider K APOs, we can compute r¯pay (C)
as
r¯pay (C) ,K (K − 1)
∫ C
rmin
rf (r)F (r) (1− F (r))K−2 dr
+KCF (C) (1− F (C))K−1
+ C
(
(1− F (C))K − (1− F (rT (C)))K
)
.
(75)
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∫ C
rmin
rg (r)F (r) dr + CF (C) (1−G (C)) +
(F (rT (C))− F (C))
K−1∑
n=0
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rT )− F (C))n (1− F (rT ))K−1−n C
n+ 1
. (72)
1
K
C
(
(1− F (C))K − (1− F (rT (C)))K
)
=
(F (rT (C))− F (C))
K−1∑
n=0
(
K − 1
n
)
(F (rT )− F (C))n (1− F (rT ))K−1−n C
n+ 1
. (73)
(K − 1)
∫ C
rmin
rf (r)F (r) (1− F (r))K−2 dr + CF (C) (1− F (C))K−1
+
1
K
C
(
(1− F (C))K − (1− F (rT (C)))K
)
. (74)
L. Example About Inefficiency in Auction
We present an example to show that even if the cooperation
mutually benefits the LTE provider and the APOs, these
two types of networks may not reach an agreement on the
cooperation.
In the example, RLTE = 95 Mbps, K = 4, δLTE = 0.4,
ηAPO = 0.3, and rk = 64 Mbps for all k ∈ K. No-
tice that APO k’s type rk is not known by the LTE and
APOs, while the distribution of rk is the common knowl-
edge. We assume that rk follows a truncated normal distri-
bution, and we obtain the distribution of rk by truncating the
normal distribution N (125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps2) to interval
[50 Mbps, 200 Mbps].
For this example, based on the numerical method mentioned
in Section IV-D, we can compute the LTE’s optimal reserve
rate as C∗ = 49.4 Mbps. Furthermore, we can compute
rX (C
∗) = 59.3 Mbps, and conclude that the APOs with types
in [50 Mbps, 59.3 Mbps] bid C∗, and the APOs with types
in (59.3 Mbps, 200 Mbps] bid “N” (based on the analysis
in SectionIII-D). Since in our example, rk = 64 Mbps for
all k ∈ K, all of these four APOs bid “N”. In other words,
the LTE cannot find any APO to cooperate with, and it will
eventually work in the competition mode. In this situation,
the LTE’s payoff is δRLTE = 38 Mbps and APO k’s (k ∈ K)
expected payoff is K−1+η
APO
K rk = 52.8 Mbps.
Next we consider the situation where the LTE changes its
reserve rate from C∗ = 49.4 Mbps to C¯ = 55 Mbps. When
C¯ = 55 Mbps, we can find rT
(
C¯
)
= 65.8 Mbps based
on the analysis in SectionIII-B. That is to say, the APOs
with types in [50 Mbps, 55 Mbps] bid their types, the APOs
with types in (55 Mbps, 65.8 Mbps] bid C¯, and the APOs
with types in (65.8 Mbps, 200 Mbps] bid “N” (based on the
analysis in SectionIII-B). In our example, rk = 64 Mbps for
all k ∈ K. Hence, when the LTE chooses its reserve rate as
C¯ = 55 Mbps, all of these four APOs bid C¯. As a result, the
LTE will randomly pick one APO to cooperate with. In this
situation, the LTE’s payoff is RLTE−C¯ = 40 Mbps and APO
k’s (k ∈ K) expected payoff is 1K C¯ + K−1K rk = 61.75 Mbps.
We find that when the LTE changes its reserve rate from
C∗ = 49.4 Mbps to C¯ = 55 Mbps, the LTE switches from
the competition mode to the cooperation mode, and both the
LTE and APOs obtain higher payoffs.
To summarize, under reserve rate 55 Mbps, the LTE and
APOs can cooperate with each other. However, due to the
incomplete information in the auction, the LTE determines its
reserve rate by only considering the probability distribution
of APOs’ types r. As a result, the LTE will choose C∗ =
49.4 Mbps as its reserve rate, which makes the LTE lose a
cooperation chance that mutually benefits both the LTE and
APOs.
IX. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: MULTI-LTE ANALYSIS
We extend our model and analysis to a more general
scenario, where there are multiple LTE providers in the system.
Based on our discussion in Section VI-C of the paper, the LTE
providers take turns to organize the auctions. Without loss
of generality, we consider the case where a particular LTE
provider organizes an auction.
Note that we focus on the cooperation between the LTE and
APOs, and do not consider the cooperation among the LTE
providers. LTE-U Forum evaluated the performance of two
LTE networks (owned by different providers) when they share
the same unlicensed channel, and the results showed that the
interference between the LTE networks is much lower than
that between the LTE and Wi-Fi APOs [6].
A. Basic Settings
We consider a general system model illustrated in Fig. 18,
where LTE provider 0 is the auctioneer and negotiates with
all the APOs. We define KS , {1, 2, . . . ,KS} (KS ≥ 2)
and KA , {KS + 1,KS + 2, . . . ,KS +KA} (KA ≥ 2).
Specifically, APO k ∈ KS shares channel k with LTE provider
k, and APO k ∈ KA occupies channel k alone. Hence, there
are a total of KS+1 LTE providers in the system: LTE provider
27
0 organizes the auction, and the remaining KS LTE providers
share the channels with the APOs from set KS .32
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Fig. 18: Generalized System Model.
APOs’ Rates: We use rk to denote the throughput that
APO k ∈ KS ∪ KA can achieve to serve its users when
it exclusively occupies a channel (without the interference
from the LTE networks). The value of rk is the private
information of APO k. The LTE providers and the other APOs
only know the probability distribution of rk. Specifically,
we assume that rk is a continuous random variable drawn
from interval [rmin, rmax] (rmin, rmax ≥ 0), and follows a
probability distribution function (PDF) f (·) and a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) F (·). Moreover, we assume that
f (·) > 0 for all r ∈ [rmin, rmax].
LTE provider 0’s Dual Modes: We assume that LTE
provider 0 achieves a channel independent throughput of
RLTE > 0 when it exclusively occupies a channel (without the
interference from the other LTE providers and APOs). Note
that we do not need to know other LTE providers’ throughputs,
as we focus on the interactions between LTE provider 0 and
APOs in the auction. LTE provider 0 can operate its network
in one of the following modes:
-Competition mode: LTE provider 0 randomly chooses
channel k ∈ KA with an equal probability and coexists with
APO k in that channel. The co-channel interference decreases
both the data rates of LTE provider 0 and APO k. We use
δLTE ∈ (0, 1) and ηAPO ∈ (0, 1) to denote LTE provider 0’s
and APO k’s data rate discounting factors, respectively. Notice
that in the competition mode, LTE provider 0 will only access
a channel from set KA, and will not access a channel from
set KS . This is because any channel from set KS is shared
by an APO and an LTE provider. Compared with accessing a
channel from set KA, accessing a channel from set KS incurs
more interference to LTE provider 0.
-Cooperation mode: LTE provider 0 reaches an agreement
with APO k ∈ KS ∪ KA, accesses channel k, and allocates
rpay to the onloaded APO k’s traffic. Specifically, if LTE
provider 0 cooperates with APO k ∈ KA, LTE provider 0
will fully occupy channel k. However, if LTE provider 0
32Here, we assume that each APO from set KS shares channel k with only
one LTE provider. This assumption helps us simplify the presentation of the
analysis (e.g., reduce the number of notations). The technique that we develop
in this section can be easily applied to the scenario where there are multiple
LTE providers coexisting with an APO from set KS .
cooperates with APO k ∈ KS , LTE provider 0 will share
channel k with LTE provider k. In this situation, the co-
channel interference decreases the data rates of both LTE
providers, and we use θLTE ∈ (0, 1) to denote the LTE
providers’ data rate discounting factor.
B. Second-Price Reverse Auction Design
We design a second-price reverse auction, where LTE
provider 0 is the auctioneer (buyer) and the KS +KA APOs
are the bidders (sellers of onloading opportunities).
Reserve Rate and Bids: In Stage I of the auction, LTE
provider 0 announces its reserve rate C ∈ [0,∞). In Stage II
of the auction, after observing the reserve rate C, APO k ∈
KS ∪KA submits a bid bk. We define the vector of all APOs’
bids as b , (bk,∀k ∈ KS ∪ KA). Specifically, APO k ∈ KS
can submit a bid bk ∈
[
0, C − (1− θLTE)RLTE] ∪ {“N”},
and APO k ∈ KA can submit a bid bk ∈ [0, C] ∪ {“N”}.
Note that APO k ∈ KS can only submit C −(
1− θLTE)RLTE as its highest bid except “N”. This is
because the benefit for LTE provider 0 of accessing channel
k ∈ KS is lower than the benefit of accessing channel
a channel from set KA, due to the interference from LTE
provider k in channel k. When LTE provider 0 onloads
the users of APO k ∈ KS and accesses channel k, LTE
provider 0 can achieve a data rate of θLTERLTE (due to
the interference from LTE provider k). When LTE provider
0 onloads the users of an APO from set KA and accesses the
corresponding channel, LTE provider 0 can achieve a data rate
of RLTE. Hence, the difference of LTE provider 0’s benefits
of accessing channel k ∈ KS and a channel from set KA is(
1− θLTE)RLTE. As a result, LTE provider 0 will not be
willing to cooperate with APO k ∈ KS if APO k’s bid is
greater than C − (1− θLTE)RLTE.
Since the benefits for LTE provider 0 of accessing a channel
from set KS and set KA are different, LTE provider 0 needs
to normalize the bid vector b to a virtual bid vector b˜ ,(
b˜k,∀k ∈ KS ∪ KA
)
to fairly compare all APOs’ requests.
Specifically, for k ∈ KA, we define b˜k , bk; for k ∈ KS , we
define b˜k as
b˜k ,{
bk+
(
1−θLTE)RLTE, if bk ∈ [0, C−(1−θLTE)RLTE],
“N”, if bk = “N”.
(76)
Hence, we have b˜k ∈
[(
1− θLTE)RLTE, C] ∪ {“N”} for
k ∈ KS . LTE provider 0 utilizes the virtual bid vector b˜ to
determine the auction outcome.
Auction Outcome: Next we discuss the auction outcome
based on the different values of b˜ and C. For ease of
exposition, we define the comparison between “N” and any
virtual bid b˜k, k ∈ KS ∪ KA, as
min
{
“N”, b˜k
}
=
{
b˜k, if b˜k ∈ [0, C] ,
“N”, if b˜k = “N”.
(77)
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Furthermore, we define Imin as the set of APOs with the
minimum virtual bid:
Imin ,
{
i ∈ KS ∪ KA : i = arg min
k∈KS∪KA
b˜k
}
. (78)
The auction has the following possible outcomes:
(a) When |Imin| = 1,33 then APO i = arg mink∈KS∪KA b˜k
is the winner. LTE provider 0 works in the cooperation mode
and accesses channel i. If i ∈ KS , LTE provider 0 serves APO
i’s users with a rate rpay = min
{
C,mink 6=i,k∈KS∪KA b˜k
}
−(
1− θLTE)RLTE; if i ∈ KA, LTE provider 0 serves APO i’s
users with a rate rpay = min
{
C,mink 6=i,k∈KS∪KA b˜k
}
;
(b) When mink∈KS∪KA b˜k ∈ [0, C] and |Imin| > 1, LTE
provider 0 works in the cooperation mode, randomly chooses
an APO from set Imin with the probability 1|Imin| , and accesses
that corresponding channel. If the chosen APO is from set
KS , LTE provider 0 serves the chosen APO’s users with a
rate rpay = mink∈KS∪KA b˜k−
(
1− θLTE)RLTE; if the chosen
APO is from set KA, LTE provider 0 serves the chosen APO’s
users with a rate rpay = mink∈KS∪KA b˜k;
(c) When mink∈KS∪KA b˜k = “N”, LTE provider 0 works
in the competition mode, randomly chooses channel k ∈ KA
with the probability 1KA , and shares the channel with APO k.
C. LTE provider 0’s Payoff
We define LTE provider 0’s payoff as the data rate that it
can allocate to its own users. Based on the summary of auction
outcome in the last subsection, we can compute LTE provider
0’s payoff as a function of the virtual bid vector b˜ and C in
(80).
Note that the expression of ΠLTE
(
b˜, C
)
in (80) captures
both the situation that an APO from set KS becomes the
winner and the situation that an APO from set KA becomes
the winner. For example, when |Imin| = 1 and APO k ∈ KS
becomes the winner, LTE provider 0’s payoff is computed as
ΠLTE
(
b˜, C
)
= θLTERLTE−
(
min
{
C, min
k 6=i,k∈KS∪KA
b˜k
}
−(1−θLTE)RLTE)
= RLTE −min
{
C, min
k 6=i,k∈KS∪KA
b˜k
}
. (79)
From this example, we show that equation (80) has already
captured the situation that an APO from set KS becomes the
winner.
D. APOs’ Payoffs
We define the payoff of APO k ∈ KS ∪ KA as the data
rate that its users receive: when APO k cooperates with
LTE provider 0, these users are served by LTE provider 0;
otherwise, they are served by APO k.
Based on the auction design, we summarize the expected
payoff of APO k ∈ KS as (81). Variable b˜k is APO k’s virtual
bid. We use b˜S,−k ,
(
b˜n, n 6= k, n ∈ KS
)
to represent the
33Note that condition |Imin| = 1 implies that mink∈KS∪KA b˜k ∈ [0, C],
as we have KS +KA > 1 APOs.
virtual bids of the remaining APOs in set KS (other than APO
k), and use b˜A ,
(
b˜n, n ∈ KA
)
to represent the virtual bids
of the APOs in set KA.
Equation (81) summarizes two possible situations: (a) when
b˜k=minn∈KS∪KA b˜n∈ [0, C], LTE provider 0 cooperates with
APO k and one of the other APOs with the minimum virtual
bid with the probability 1|Imin| and the probability 1 − 1|Imin|
(1 ≤ |Imin| ≤ KS + KA), respectively. In the former case,
APO k’s users are onloaded to LTE provider 0 and receive
rate min
{
C,minn 6=k,n∈KS∪KA b˜n
}
−(1−θLTE)RLTE. In the
latter case, APO k’s users are served by APO k and receive
rate ηAPOrk; (b) otherwise, LTE provider 0 does not access
channel k, and APO k’s users are served by APO k and receive
rate ηAPOrk.
Based on the auction design, we summarize the expected
payoff of APO k ∈ KA as (82). We use b˜S ,
(
b˜n, n ∈ KS
)
to represent the virtual bids of the APOs in set KS . Vari-
able b˜k is APO k’s virtual bid, and we use b˜A,−k ,(
b˜n, n 6= k, n ∈ KA
)
to represent the virtual bids of the
remaining APOs in set KA (other than APO k).
Equation (82) summarizes three possible situations: (a)
when b˜k > minn∈KS∪KA b˜n, LTE provider 0 accesses a
channel from one of the APOs (other than APO k) with the
minimum virtual bid. As a result, APO k can exclusively
occupy its own channel k, and serve its users with rate rk; (b)
when b˜k=minn∈KS∪KA b˜n∈ [0, C], LTE provider 0 cooper-
ates with APO k and one of the other APOs with the minimum
virtual bid with the probability 1|Imin| and the probability
1− 1|Imin| (1 ≤ |Imin| ≤ KS+KA), respectively. Hence, APO
k’s users receive rate min
{
C,minn 6=k,n∈KS∪KA b˜n
}
and rate
rk with the probability 1|Imin| and the probability 1 − 1|Imin| ,
respectively; (c) when minn∈KS∪KA b˜n = “N”, there is no
winner in the auction, and LTE provider 0 randomly chooses
a channel from set KA to coexist with the corresponding APO.
With the probability 1KA , APO k coexists with LTE provider
0 and has a data rate of ηAPOrk; with the probability 1− 1KA ,
APO k has a data rate of rk by exclusively occupying channel
k. In this case, the expected data rate that APO k’s users
receive is KA−1+η
APO
KA
rk.
For the parameters and distributions that character-
ize the APOs, rk is the private information of APO
k ∈ KS ∪ KA, and the remaining information, i.e.,
KS ,KA, rmin, rmax, f (·) , F (·) , and ηAPO, is publicly known
to all the APOs and LTE provider 0. For the parameters that
characterize LTE provider 0, θLTE will be announced by LTE
provider 0 to all APOs, as θLTE is included in the auction
rule (θLTE affects the feasibilities of the bids of APOs from
set KS). For the remaining parameters that characterize LTE
provider 0, i.e., RLTE and δLTE, as we will see in later
sections, they will not affect the APOs’ strategies. Therefore,
they can be either made known or kept unknown to the APOs.
Next we analyze the auction by backward induction. In
Section IX-E, we analyze the APOs’ equilibrium strategies
in Stage II, given LTE provider 0’s reserve rate C in Stage
I. In Section IX-F, we analyze LTE provider 0’s equilibrium
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ΠLTE
(
b˜, C
)
=

RLTE −min
{
C,mink 6=i,k∈KS∪KA b˜k
}
, if |Imin| = 1,
RLTE −mink∈KS∪KA b˜k, if mink∈KS∪KA b˜k ∈ [0, C] and |Imin| > 1,
δLTERLTE, if mink∈KS∪KA b˜k = “N”.
(80)
ΠAPOk
((
b˜k, b˜S,−k
)
, b˜A, C
)
=

1
|Imin|
(
min
{
C,minn 6=k,n∈KS∪KA b˜n
}
−(1−θLTE)RLTE) if b˜k= minn∈KS∪KA b˜n∈ [0, C] ,
+ |Imin|−1|Imin| η
APOrk,
ηAPOrk, otherwise.
(81)
ΠAPOk
(
b˜S ,
(
b˜k, b˜A,−k
)
, C
)
=

rk, if b˜k > minn∈KS∪KA b˜n,
1
|Imin|min
{
C,minn 6=k,n∈KS∪KA b˜n
}
+ |Imin|−1|Imin| rk, if b˜k=minn∈KS∪KA b˜n∈ [0, C] ,
KA−1+ηAPO
KA
rk, if minn∈KS∪KA b˜n = “N”.
(82)
reserve rate C∗ in Stage I by anticipating the APOs’ equilib-
rium strategies in Stage II. In Section IX-G, we provide the
simulation results for the comparison between our auction-
based scheme and the benchmark scheme.
E. Stage II: APOs’ Equilibrium Bidding Strategies
In this section, we assume that the reserve rate C of LTE
provider 0 in Stage I is given, and analyze the APOs’ equi-
librium strategies in Stage II. Note that studying the APOs’
strategies in terms of vector b and vector b˜ is equivalent.
For ease of exposition, we characterize the APOs’ equilibrium
strategies in terms of b˜.
1) Definition of Symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: We
focus on the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (SBNE),
which is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Under a reserve rate C, bidding strategy func-
tions b˜∗S (r, C) and b˜
∗
A (r, C), r ∈ [rmin, rmax], constitute
a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if (83)
holds for all dk ∈
[(
1− θLTE)RLTE, C] ∪ {“N”}, all
rk ∈ [rmin, rmax], and all k ∈ KS; and (84) holds for all
dk ∈ [0, C] ∪ {“N”}, all rk ∈ [rmin, rmax], and all k ∈ KA.
In (83), we use b˜∗S (rk, C) to represent the equilibrium
bidding strategy of APO k ∈ KS , and use vector function
b˜∗S,−k (rS,−k, C) ,
(
b˜∗S (rn, C) , n 6= k, n ∈ KS
)
to repre-
sent the equilibrium bidding strategies of the remaining APOs
in set KS (other than APO k). We also use vector function
b˜∗A (rA, C) ,
(
b˜∗A (rn, C) , n ∈ KA
)
to represent the equilib-
rium bidding strategies of the APOs in set KA.
The left hand side of inequality (83) stands for the expected
payoff of APO k ∈ KS when it bids b˜∗S (rk, C). The expecta-
tion is taken with respect to rS,−k , (rn,∀n 6= k, n ∈ KS)
and rA , (rn, n ∈ KA), which denote the types of the
remaining APOs in set KS (other than APO k) and all APOs in
set KA, respectively. The vectors rS,−k and rA are unknown
to APO k. Inequality (83) implies that APO k ∈ KS cannot
improve its expected payoff by unilaterally changing its bid
from b˜∗S (rk, C) to any dk ∈
[(
1− θLTE)RLTE, C]∪ {“N”}.
In (84), we use vector function b˜∗S (rS , C) ,(
b˜∗S (rn, C) , n ∈ KS
)
to represent the equilibrium
bidding strategies of the APOs in set KS . Moreover,
we use b˜∗A (rk, C) to represent the equilibrium bidding
strategy of APO k ∈ KA, and use vector function
b˜∗A,−k (rA,−k, C) ,
(
b˜∗A (rn, C) , n 6= k, n ∈ KA
)
to
represent the equilibrium bidding strategies of the remaining
APOs in set KA (other than APO k).
The left hand side of inequality (84) stands for the expected
payoff of APO k ∈ KA when it bids b˜∗A (rk, C). The
expectation is taken with respect to rS , (rn,∀n ∈ KS) and
rA,−k , (rn, n 6= k, n ∈ KA), which denote the types of all
APOs in set KS and the remaining APOs in set KA (other than
APO k), respectively. The vectors rS and rA,−k are unknown
to APO k. Inequality (84) implies that APO k ∈ KA cannot
improve its expected payoff by unilaterally changing its bid
from b˜∗A (rk, C) to any dk ∈ [0, C] ∪ {“N”}.
2) Equilibrium Strategies b˜∗S (r, C) and b˜
∗
A (r, C): Next
we characterize the APOs’ equilibrium strategy functions
b˜∗S (r, C) and b˜
∗
A (r, C). First, we introduce the following
lemmas.
Lemma 11. The following equation admits at least one
solution r in (rmin, rmax):
KA−1∑
n=1
(
KA − 1
n
)
Fn (r) (1− F (r))KA−1−n C − r
n+ 1
+
(1− F (r))KA−1
(
C − KA − 1 + η
APO
KA
r
)
= 0. (85)
We denote the solutions r in (rmin, rmax) as rxl (C) with 1 ≤
l ≤ L, where L is the number of solutions.
Lemma 12. The following equation admits at least one
solution r in (C, rmax):
KA−1∑
n=1
(
KA − 1
n
)
(F (r)−F (C))n (1−F (r))KA−1−n C − r
n+ 1
+ (1− F (r))KA−1
(
C − KA − 1 + η
APO
KA
r
)
= 0. (86)
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ErS,−k,rA
{
ΠAPOk
((
b˜∗S (rk, C) , b˜
∗
S,−k (rS,−k, C)
)
, b˜∗A (rA, C), C
)
|rk
}
≥ ErS,−k,rA
{
ΠAPOk
((
dk, b˜
∗
S,−k (rS,−k, C)
)
, b˜∗A (rA, C), C
)
|rk
}
, (83)
ErS ,rA,−k
{
ΠAPOk
(
b˜∗S (rS , C),
(
b˜∗A (rk, C) , b˜
∗
A,−k (rA,−k, C)
)
, C
)
|rk
}
≥ ErS ,rA,−k
{
ΠAPOk
(
b˜∗S (rS , C),
(
dk, b˜
∗
A,−k (rA,−k, C)
)
, C
)
|rk
}
, (84)
We denote the solutions r in (C, rmax) as rtm (C) with 1 ≤
m ≤M , where M is the number of solutions.
Based on the definitions of rxl (C) and r
t
m (C), we introduce
the APOs’ equilibrium strategies. For any reserve rate C ∈
[0,∞), functions (87) and (88) constitute an SBNE, where
rX (C) belongs to the set of {rxl (C) , 1 ≤ l ≤ L} and rT (C)
belongs to the set of {rtm (C) , 1 ≤ m ≤M}.
From (87) and (88), we observe that only the APOs from
set KA with some types rk may bid the reserve rate C. That is
to say, the allocative externalities only exist among the APOs
from set KA. This is because LTE provider 0 only accesses the
channels used by the APOs from set KA under the competition
mode. In other words, LTE provider 0 will only interfere with
the APOs from set KA under the competition mode, which
pushes the APOs from set KA with some types to bid the
reserve rate.
Note that there exist other equilibrium strategy functions
that deviate from (87) or (88) at some special regions and
also constitute an SBNE. For example, if we revise b˜∗A (rk, C)
as function b˜′A (rk, C) in (89), then functions b˜
∗
S (rk, C) and
b˜′A (rk, C) also constitute an SBNE. However, we can easily
show that functions b˜∗S (rk, C) and b˜
′
A (rk, C) generate the
same auction outcome (e.g., APOs’ expected payoffs) as func-
tions b˜∗S (rk, C) and b˜
∗
A (rk, C). Therefore, we can focus on
functions b˜∗S (rk, C) and b˜
∗
A (rk, C), and analyze LTE provider
0’s equilibrium strategy accordingly.
F. Stage I: LTE Provider 0’s Reserve Rate
In this section, we analyze LTE provider 0’s optimal reserve
rate by anticipating APOs’ equilibrium strategies in Stage II.
We first make the following assumption on the CDF of an
APO’s type, which implies that rX (C) and rT (C) in (88)
are unique.
Assumption 2. Under the cumulative distribution function
F (·), (a) equation (85) has a unique solution in (rmin, rmax),
i.e., L = 1, and (b) equation (86) has a unique solution in
(C, rmax), i.e., M = 1.
We define LTE provider 0’s expected payoff as
Π¯LTE (C) , ErS ,rA
{
ΠLTE
((
b˜∗S (rS , C) , b˜
∗
A (rA, C)
)
, C
)}
.
(90)
Recall that rS and rA are the types of the
APOs from set KS and set KA, respectively.
Moreover, b˜∗S (rS , C) =
(
b˜∗S (rn, C) , n ∈ KS
)
and
b˜∗A (rA, C) =
(
b˜∗A (rn, C) , n ∈ KA
)
are the equilibrium
strategies of the APOs from set KS and set KA, respectively.
Specifically, b˜∗S (rS , C) is determined based on (87), and
b˜∗A (rA, C) is determined based on (88).
The LTE provider determines the optimal reserve rate by
solving
max
C∈[0,∞)
Π¯
LTE
(C) (91)
s.t.max
{
b˜S,max (C)−
(
1−θLTE)RLTE, b˜A,max (C)}≤RLTE,
(92)
where we define
b˜S,max (C) ,
max
{
b˜∗S (rk, C)∈
[(
1−θLTE)RLTE,C] : rk∈ [rmin, rmax]} ,
(93)
b˜A,max (C) , max
{
b˜∗A (rk, C) ∈ [0, C] : rk ∈ [rmin, rmax]
}
.
(94)
Here, b˜S,max (C) is the maximum possible virtual bid (except
“N”) from the APOs from set KS at the SBNE under C, and
b˜A,max (C) is the maximum possible virtual bid (except “N”)
from the APOs from set KA at the SBNE under C. Constraints
(92) ensures that LTE provider 0 has enough capacity to satisfy
the bid from the winning APO.
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Fig. 19: Example of Function Π¯LTE (C) (Multi-LTE Case).
We can solve problem (91)-(92) through numerical meth-
ods. In Fig. 19, we illustrate an example of Π¯LTE (C),
where we choose KS = 4, KA = 2, δLTE = 0.4,
ηAPO = 0.3, θLTE = 0.5, and RLTE = 200 Mbps,
and obtain the distribution of rk by truncating the nor-
mal distribution N (125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps2) to interval
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b˜∗S (rk, C) =

ηAPOrk +
(
1− θLTE)RLTE, if rk ∈ [rmin, C−(1−θLTE)RLTEηAPO ],
“N”, if rk ∈
(
C−(1−θLTE)RLTE
ηAPO , rmax
]
,
(87)
b˜∗A (rk, C) =

“N”, if C ∈
[
0, KA−1+η
APO
KA
rmin
]
,
C, if C ∈
(
KA−1+ηAPO
KA
rmin, rmin
)
and rk ∈ [rmin, rX (C)],
“N”, if C ∈
(
KA−1+ηAPO
KA
rmin, rmin
)
and rk ∈ (rX (C) , rmax],
rk, if C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and rk ∈ [rmin, C] ,
C, if C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and rk ∈ (C, rT (C)],
“N”, if C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax],
rk, if C ∈ [rmax,∞) ,
(88)
b˜′A (rk, C) =

“N”, if C ∈
[
0, KA−1+η
APO
KA
rmin
]
,
C, if C ∈
(
KA−1+ηAPO
KA
rmin, rmin
)
and rk ∈ [rmin, rX (C)],
“N”, if C ∈
(
KA−1+ηAPO
KA
rmin, rmin
)
and rk ∈ (rX (C) , rmax],
rk, if C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and rk ∈ [rmin, C] ,
C, if C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and rk ∈ (C, rT (C)],
“N”, if C ∈ [rmin, rmax) and rk ∈ (rT (C) , rmax],
rk, if C ∈ [rmax,∞) and rk ∈ [rmin, rmax) ,
any value in [rmax, C]∪{“N”} , if C ∈ [rmax,∞) and rk = rmax,
(89)
[50 Mbps, 200 Mbps]. We observe that Π¯LTE (C) is a uni-
modal function, and we can apply the Golden Section method
to determine the optimal C∗.
G. Numerical Results
In this section, we compare our auction-based spectrum
sharing scheme with a state-of-the-art benchmark scheme for
the multi-LTE scenario. Specifically, we randomly pick the
APOs, and implement both schemes. Given the APO set KS
and APO set KA, the two schemes work as follows:
• Our auction-based scheme: First, LTE provider 0 de-
termines C∗ numerically based on Section IX-F. Sec-
ond, each APO k ∈ KS submits its bid based on the
equilibrium strategy b˜∗S (rk, C
∗) in (87), and each APO
k ∈ KA submits its bid based on the equilibrium strategy
b∗A (rk, C
∗) in (88). Third, LTE provider 0 determines its
working mode, the winning APO, and the allocated data
rate based on the auction rule in Section IX-B.
• Benchmark scheme: LTE provider 0 randomly picks an
APO from set KA, and shares the corresponding channel
with the APO.
For particular APO sets KS and KA, we denote LTE
provider 0’s payoff under our auction-based and the bench-
mark schemes as piLTEa and pi
LTE
b , respectively. Furthermore,
we denote all KS+KA APOs’ total payoffs under our auction-
based and the benchmark schemes as piAPOa and pi
APO
b ,
respectively. For particular APO sets KS and KA, we compute
the relative performance gains of our auction-based scheme
over the benchmark scheme in terms of the LTE’s payoff and
the APOs’ total payoff as
ρLTE , pi
LTE
a − piLTEb
piLTEb
and ρAPO , pi
APO
a − piAPOb
piAPOb
. (95)
We consider four pairs of
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
:
(0.4, 0.1) , (0.4, 0.3) , (0.4, 0.7), and (0.6, 0.3), and change
RLTE from 30 Mbps to 370 Mbps. Moreover, we
choose KS = 2, KA = 2, θLTE = 0.5, and obtain
the distribution of rk, k ∈ KS ∪ KA, by truncating the
normal distribution N (125 Mbps, 2500 Mbps2) to interval
[50 Mbps, 200 Mbps]. We illustrate the simulation scenario
in Fig. 20.
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Fig. 20: In the simulation, we choose KS = 2 and KA = 2. There are three
LTE providers and four APOs in the system: LTE provider 0 organizes the
auction, LTE provider 1 coexists with APO 1 in channel 1, LTE provider 2
coexists with APO 2 in channel 2, and APOs 3 and 4 occupy channels 3 and
4 alone, respectively.
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Fig. 21: Comparison on LTE’s Payoff (Multi-LTE Case).
Given a pair of
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
and a particular value of
RLTE, we randomly choose rk, k ∈ KS ∪ KA, based on
the truncated normal distribution, implement our auction-based
scheme and the benchmark scheme separately, and record the
corresponding values of ρLTE and ρAPO. For each pair of(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
and each value of RLTE, we run the experiment
20, 000 times, and obtain the corresponding average values of
ρLTE and ρAPO.
In Fig. 21, we plot the average ρLTE against RLTE for
different
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
pairs. When RLTE = 370 Mbps and
δLTE = 0.4, we observe that all the average ρLTE (i.e., the
black, red, and purple curves) are between 60% ∼ 75%.
Notice that for the simulation of the single-LTE scenario, we
also have four APOs, but each of them occupies a channel
alone. We have provided the results of ρLTE for the single-LTE
scenario in Fig. 10 of our paper, where all the average ρLTE
with RLTE = 370 Mbps and δLTE = 0.4 are around 70%.
Comparing Fig. 21 with Fig. 10, we conclude that our auction
can significantly improve the LTE’s payoff for the multi-LTE
scenario as well as the single-LTE scenario. We summarize
the observations in Fig. 21 as follows.
Observation 8. For the multi-LTE scenario, our auction-
based scheme improves the LTE’s payoff by more than 60%
on average under a large RLTE and a small δLTE, compared
with the benchmark scheme.
In Fig. 22, we plot the average ρAPO against RLTE for
different
(
δLTE, ηAPO
)
pairs. When RLTE = 370 Mbps,
δLTE = 0.4, and ηAPO = 0.1, we observe that the corre-
sponding average ρAPO is around 60%. In contrast, Fig. 11
of our paper shows the results of ρAPO for the single-LTE
scenario, where the average ρAPO with RLTE = 370 Mbps,
δLTE = 0.4, and ηAPO = 0.1 is around 32%. Therefore, the
improvement of the APOs’ total payoff under our auction-
based scheme for the multi-LTE scenario can be greater than
that for the single-LTE scenario. This is because compared
with the single-LTE scenario, the APOs are more severely
interfered by the LTE networks in the multi-LTE scenario.
Under the benchmark scheme, the APOs’ total payoff (i.e.,
piAPOb ) for the multi-LTE scenario is smaller than that for
the single-LTE scenario. Therefore, when implementing our
auction-based scheme and allowing the LTE and APOs to
cooperate with each other, the percentage of the improvement
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Fig. 22: Comparison on APOs’ Payoffs (Multi-LTE Case).
of the APOs’ total payoff (i.e., ρAPO , pi
APO
a −piAPOb
piAPOb
) for the
multi-LTE scenario will be greater than that for the single-
LTE scenario. We summarize the observations in Fig. 22 as
follows.
Observation 9. The improvement of the APOs’ total payoff
under our auction-based scheme for the multi-LTE scenario
can be greater than that for the single-LTE scenario.
Combing Observations 8 and 9, we conclude that our
auction-based scheme can significantly improve both the
LTE’s and APOs’ payoffs for the multi-LTE scenario. In other
words, our auction-based scheme works well for the multi-LTE
scenario.
